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This Article considers the long-term implications of  Bush v. Gore  for
the Court's institutional  standing and legitimacy. First,  the Article argues
that if the Court's  legitimacy turns on the legal  soundness of its reasoning,
the Court is in a lot of trouble, since  few neutral and detached lawyers will
be convinced that the result in Bush v. Gore was a product of  anything but
the conservative Justices'  partisan  preference  for George W. Bush. Second,
the Article considers the alternative premise that history's verdict on a
Supreme Court ruling  depends more on whether  public opinion ultimately
supports the outcome than on the  quality of the legal reasoning or the
craftsmanship of the Court's opinion. The Article canvasses some of the
landmark decisions in  American  constitutional histoy-Dred Scott  v.
Sandford, Brown v. Board of Education,  Furman v. Georgia, Roe v. Wade,
and others-with the aim of deriving a list offactors that  predict  how par-
ticular rulings will affect the Court's reputation. Then, applying these fac-
tors, the Article predicts that the long-term consequences of Bush v. Gore
for the Court's reputation are likely to be relatively minimal, mainly be-
cause half the country approves of the result and because the underlying
issue will rapidly become obsolete.
On December 12, 2000, the United States Supreme Court, for the first
time  in  its  history,  picked  a president.!  By  shutting  down  the  statewidd
manual  recount  that  had  been  ordered just  days  earlier  by the  Florida
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1.  See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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Supreme  Court,  the  High  Court  Justices  ensured  that  George  W.  Bush
would become the forty-third president of the United States.2
In this Article, I  shall speculate  on the long-term implications of this
controversial  ruling  for the Court's  institutional  standing  and  legitimacy.
My strategy will be to canvas  some of the landmark decisions in American
constitutional history-Dred  Scott v. Sandford, 3 Brown v. Board of  Educa-
tion, 4 Furman v. Georgia, 5 Roe v.  Wade,6 and others-with the aim of de-
riving  a list of factors  that predict  how  particular rulings  will  affect the
Court's reputation. Then I shall consider how those variables apply to Bush
v. Gore and predict that decision's long-term consequences.
The  premise  of this  Article  is  that  history's  verdict  on  a  Supreme
Court ruling depends  more on whether public  opinion ultimately supports
the outcome than on the quality of the legal reasoning or the craftsmanship
of the Court's opinion.  I do not intend to defend that premise  here,  other
than to say that history's judgment on Brown v. Board of Education, the
ultimate  feather  in  the  Court's  constitutional  cap,  seems  to  confirm  its
plausibility. The legal reasoning in Brown was widely ridiculed at the time,
both by White southerners distraught  over the threat posed by the decision
to their cherished  "way of life"7  and by  elite legal  academics  and judges
deeply  invested  in the enterprise  of "reasoned  elaboration."8  The  Brown
Court's dubious rendition  of the original understanding  of the Fourteenth
Amendment,  its willingness  to  overturn decades'  worth of precedent  sus-
taining  the  constitutionality  of racial  segregation,  and  its  unprecedented
invocation of sociological  data in support of its legal conclusion  rendered
the decision  susceptible to criticism, both from  supporters  and opponents
of racial  segregation.'  Yet,  over  the  course  of ensuing  decades,  Brown
2.  The seemingly endless post-election newspaper recounts  coming out of Florida only confirm
that "the  ultimate truth...  is probably  beyond  reach."  David  Corn,  The Florida Fog, THE  NATION,
Mar.  19,  2001,  at 4. Whether  Bush or Gore would have won the manual recount  seems to depend  on
which  counties were recounted,  which standards  were used  for ascertaining  voter intent, and whether
overvotes  were  counted  as  well  as undervotes.  See,  e.g.,  Martin  Mer-zer,  Review Shows Ballots Say
Bush, MIAMi  HERALD,  Apr. 4, 2001,  at Al  (notwithstanding the headline,  reporting that the  winner of
the presidential recount would have depended on how many counties were recounted and what standard
was used, and noting the ironic result that Bush would have won  on the lenient standard advocated by
Gore and that Gore would have won on the stringent standard advocated by Bush).
3.  60 U.S.  (19 How.) 393  (1857).
4.  347 U.S. 483  (1954).
5.  408 U.S. 238  (1972).
6.  410 U.S.  13  (1973).
7.  See, e.g., TOM  BRADY,  BLACK  MONDAY (1955);  JAMEs J. KILPATRICK,  THE SoUTrrRN  CASE
FOR SCHOOL SEGREGATION  (1962).
8.  See, e.g.,  LEARNED  HAND,  THE  BILL  OF  RIGHTS  55  (1958)  ("1  have  never  been able  to
understand on what  basis  [Brown] does  or can rest  except  as  a  coup de main."); Herbert  Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional  Law, 73  HARv.  L.  REv.  1, 32-34  (1959)  (criticizing the
Court in Brown for its failure to justify its result on the basis of any "neutral principle").
9.  See, e.g.,  sources  cited supra notes  7-8;  Edmond  Cahn, Jurisprudence,  30  N.Y.U.  L.  Rav.
150 (1955); see also Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism,  and Constitutional  Theory: A Response
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became  a cultural  icon,  and  the Court's vanguard role  in the civil rights
movement  (at least relative to that of other governmental  institutions) has
enormously enhanced its prestige among the American people." l  This con-
version  of Brown  from  a  target  of vituperative  legal  and  sociopolitical
criticism  into  a  cultural  icon  may  suggest  that  the  Court's  long-term
standing depends more on getting its decisions right, by which I mean rul-
ing  in  a manner  consonant  with  long-term  public  opinion,  than  on  the
quality of its legal reasoning.
Of course, this premise may be mistaken. The Justices themselves,  for
example, seem convinced of the opposite view:  that the Court's legitimacy
depends  on its  ability to convince  observers  that its rulings  are based  on
sound  legal principle,  rather than political  calculation or personal  prefer-
ence.  Thus,  in  reaffirming  the  vitality  of the  Court's  landmark  abortion
rights decision, Roe v.  Wade, the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood
v.  Casey  declared  that  "the  underlying  substance  of  [the  Court's]
legitimacy  is  of  course  the  warrant  for  the  Court's  decisions  in  the
Constitution  and the lesser sources  of legal principle  on which the Court
draws."1 '  Further,  the  plurality  stated,  "a  decision  without  principled
justification would be no judicial act at all" and "[t]he Court must take care
to speak  and act in ways  that allow  people to accept its decisions  on the
terms  the  Court claims  for them,  as  grounded  truly  in principle,  not  as
compromises  with social and political pressures  .....  12  Likewise, the plu-
rality  opinion  in Bowers v. Hardwick observed  that "[t]he  Court is  most
vulnerable  and  comes  nearest  to  illegitimacy  when  it  deals  with
judge-made  constitutional  law  having little or no cognizable  roots  in the
language or design of the Constitution."' 3
For the sake of the Court's legitimacy, one must hope that the Justices
are  wrong about this, for it will be difficult to find neutral  and detached
lawyers who believe that Bush v. Gore was "grounded truly in principle" or
"in the language or design of the Constitution,"  rather than in the conser-
vative Justices'  partisan preference  for George W. Bush in the 2000 presi-
dential election. 4 In Part I of this Article, I shall try to demonstrate that the
to Professor  McConnell, 81  VA. L. REv.  1881,  1931  (1995)  (noting that in 1954 Brown "was not seen
to be so obviously correct").
10.  See, e.g.,  JOHN  C. JEFFEs, JR.,  JusTicE  LEvis  F.  PoWELL,  JR.  330  (1994)  (stating that
Brown "is  universally  approved  as both  right and necessary[;]  ...  [more  powerful  by  far than  any
academic  theory of constitutional  interpretation is the legend of Brown"). For other similar statements,
see the sources cited in Karman, supra note 9, at 1928 n.125.
11.  505 U.S.  833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion).
12.  Id.
13.  478 U.S.  186,  194 (1986)  (plurality opinion).
14.  For some  representative  critiques of Bush, see Ronald Dworkin,  A  Badly Flawed Election,
N.Y. REv.  OF BooKs, Jan.  11,  2001,  at 53  (calling Bush "one of the least persuasive  Supreme  Court
opinions that I have ever read"); Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace,  NEw REPuBLc, Dec. 25, 2000, at 18  (noting
that the Justices,  "by not  even bothering  to cloak their willfulness  in  legal arguments  intelligible  to
people of good faith who  do not share their views....  made it impossible  for citizens  of the United
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Bush result can be explained only  in terms of the conservative  majority's
partisan political preferences. In Part II,  I will consider the likely impact of
this ruling on the Court's long-term institutional standing.
I
Bush v. Gore:  LAW OR POLITICS?
Just  one  day  after  the Court  rendered  its  decision  in Bush v.  Gore,
Justice  Clarence Thomas appealed  to  a group of high  school  students vis-
iting the Court not to attribute  the ruling to the Justices'  partisan prefer-
ences:  "I have yet to hear any discussion, in nine years, of partisan politics
among  members  of the  court."'5  Chief Justice  Rehnquist,  asked by  the
press to comment on Thomas's remarks,  agreed "absolutely"  with his  col-
league's statement. 6 It is an interesting question whether these two Justices
genuinely believe their pretensions  to nonpartisan decisionmaking.1 7  Court
watchers,  possibly less in need of self-delusion,  are likely to regard  such
claims as preposterous.
As a preliminary matter, it is helpful to identify precisely what distin-
guishes Bush v. Gore from other cases of constitutional interpretation. Any
serious  student  of constitutional  law  appreciates  that  political  ideology
necessarily  influences  constitutional  interpretation.  The  text  of  the
Constitution is so  open-ended,  and the debate over permissible  sources of
interpretation so inconclusive,  that it is virtually impossible for a judge not
to be influenced  by political  ideology when construing the Constitution. 8
Thus, we should not be (and most of us are not) surprised when the Justices
divide,  along  predictable  political  lines,  when  adjudicating  the  constitu-
tionality of abortion restrictions,  school prayer, gay rights,  affirmative ac-
tion, minority voting districts,  and a wide variety of federalism  issues, just
States to sustain any kind of faith in the rule of law...."); Anthony Lewis, A  Failure  ofReason:  The
Supreme Court's  Ruling Isn't Convincing,  PrrrSBURGH POsr-GAzE-rE, Dec.  18, 2000, at A13 (judging
the  decision  "a  dismal  failure,"  judged  by  the  standard  of providing  "reasoned  arguments,"  and
concluding  that  it "invites  people  to  treat  the court's  aura  of reason  as  an  illusion");  Neal  Katyal,
Politics Over Principle, WASH.  POST,  Dec.  14,  2000,  at  A35  (calling  the  decision  "lawless  and
unprecedented");  J.  Dionne  Jr.,  So  Much for States'  Rights,  WASH.  PosT,  Dec.  14,  2000,  at A35
(accusing  the majority of "contort[ing]  their own principles  and creat[ing]  new law");  Scott Turow, A
Brand  New Game; No  Turning Backfrom the Dart  the Court  Has Thrown, WASH. POST, Dec.  17, 2000,
at  B 1 (quoting  Terry  Sandalow  to  the  effect  that  the  decision  was  "incomprehensible"  and  "an
unmistakably partisan decision without any foundation in law').
15.  Robert G. Kaiser, Opinion Is Sharply Divided on Ruling's Consequences,  WASH.  Posr, Dec.
14, 2000,  at A25.
16.  Id.
17.  See,  e.g., Jack  M.  Balkin, Bush  v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110
YALE  L.J.  1407,  1407  (2001)  (wondering  whether  Justice  Thomas  "also  told  the  students  that  he
believed  in Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny, and the Tooth Fairy").
18.  See,  e.g.,  Michael  J. Klarman,  Fidelity, Indeterminacy, and the Problem of Constitutional
Evil, 65 FoDn-HA M L. REv. 1740  (1997).
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to name some of the more prominent constitutional disputes adjudicated by
the Rehnquist Court. 9
Yet, Bush v. Gore is importantly different from these other  constitu-
tional  cases.  It is one  thing to  say that a judge's political  ideology  influ-
ences her constitutional interpretations.  It is quite  another to  say that her
partisan political preferences  do.2" The Bush outcome was not a product of
the  conservative  Justices'  political  ideologies.  As  we  shall  see,  these
Justices'  oft-professed  commitment to federalism  and to judicial  restraint
logically should have led them to the opposite result. Rather, the Bush out-
come  was  a  product  of these  Justices'  partisan  political  preference  for
George W. Bush, which, for at least a couple of them, may have been en-
hanced  by  their  desire  to  retire  from  the  Court  while  a  Republican
President is in office to choose their replacements.2' Another way of stating
the point is this:  Had all the other facts in the Florida election imbroglio
remained the same, but the situation of the two presidential candidates been
reversed,  does  anyone  seriously  believe  that  the  conservative  Justices
would have reached the  same result?'  It is  telling how  even Republican
commentators  defending  Bush generally have refrained  from arguing  for
this conclusion.'
19.  See cases cited infra  notes 242-243, 245-246.
20.  See,  e.g.,  Linda  Greenhouse,  Another Kind of Bitter Split,  N.Y.  TIMEs,  Dec.  15,  2000,
reprinted in BUSH v. GoRE:  THE  CoURT  CASES AND  THE Co,,mm  ARY 296,  299 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. &
William Kristol eds., 2001)  [hereinafter BUSH v. GORE]  (quoting law professor Suzanna Sherry making
this  same  distinction  between  jurisprudential  philosophy  and partisan  politics);  Randall  Kennedy,
Contempt of Court, 12  AmaER.  PROSPECT  15,  Jan. 2001,  reprinted in BUSH  V.  GORE,  supra, at 336-37
(urging the same distinction).
21.  Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, The Truth Behind the Pillars,  NEWSWEEK,  Dec. 25, 2000, at
46  (reporting Justice  O'Connor's  election  eve remark  that it was  "terrible"  that Al  Gore  had been
projected  to win  Florida (and presumably the election) and her husband's  explanation  that this meant
the couple's retirement from Washington, D.C., would have to wait another four years).
22.  But see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy  and Disorder,  68  U. CHI. L. REv. 695  (2001)  (noting
that  the voting  pattem  of the  Justices  in  Bush v.  Gore closely  mirrors  that  in  several  recent  cases
involving  the constitutional  law governing the political process,  thus suggesting  that simple partisan
politics  may not explain the Bush result). Republican  defenders of Bush probably would respond that
the liberal Justices  likewise voted their partisan political preferences. Yet, it is not so clear that this is
true. First, two of the Bush dissenters, Justices  Souter and Stevens, were Republicans  for most of  their
adult lives,  and for all we  know still consider themselves to be such. While  both of these Justices  do
evince  liberal voting patterns in constitutional cases, it seems unjustified to assume that either or both
of them necessarily supported the Democratic presidential candidate in the 2000 election. Second, and
more importantly, it is unfair to the four dissenters to assume that they would have voted the opposite
way had the parties been reversed. The majority and dissenting opinions are similar in that each set of
Justices  reached  results that  seem consistent with their partisan political preferences  (on  the dubious
assumption,  questioned  above,  that  Souter  and  Stevens  preferred  Gore  to  Bush).  The  two  sets  of
opinions  are  dissimilar,  as  I  hope to  show, in  that the  dissenters  followed  existing  law,  while  the
majority made up new (bad) law.
23.  Conservative  commentators  defending the Court's ruling have tended to emphasize that the
Court saved the country from  a constitutional  crisis,  or that it was  Gore who  initially invited judicial
resolution of the election controversy (and thus scarcely  can be heard to complain when the Supreme
Court provided  that resolution),  or that  Democrats are hypocritical to  complain  of judicial  activism,
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Thus,  the result in Bush v. Gore depended  on the order in which the
parties'  names appeared  on the case caption. This  is extraordinary.  Every
first-year law student is taught that a minimum requirement of the rule of
law is that the outcome  of cases  ought not to vary  simply as  a result of re-
versing the parties to the litigation. It may simply be a failure of imagina-
tion, but I cannot think of another Supreme Court decision about which one
can say with equal  confidence  that reversing the parties, and nothing else,
would have changed the result.
If we broaden  our perspective  beyond  constitutional  litigation,  how-
ever,  an  analogous  instance  does  come  to mind:  the  recent  Clinton  im-
peachment  episode.  Many  observers  plausibly  concluded  that  the  two
parties'  positions on the substantive  standard for impeachment, as well  as
on related procedural issues, were entirely a product of their partisan com-
mitments. That is, had it been a Republican president being impeached for
identical behavior, the Democrats would have insisted on a lower threshold
standard  for  impeachment,  the  necessity  of the  Senate  pursuing  an  im-
peachment trial to its bitter end, and so forth.
While  I think  this  is  the  right  way  to  understand  the  Clinton  im-
peachment, 4  it  still  leaves  one  crucial  distinction  between  that constitu-
tional  controversy  and  Bush  v.  Gore.  The  constitutional  law  of
impeachment  is highly  indeterminate.  The  constitutional text is spare, the
original intent evidence  is conflicting  and inconclusive,  and precedents  on
impeachment  are few and far between."  Given this degree of constitutional
indeterminacy,  it was inevitable that partisan preferences  would drive post
hoc  constitutional  interpretations  regarding  Clinton's  impeachment.  Bush
which  they  invented. See, e.g., John  Yoo, In Defense of the  Court's  Legitimacy, 68  U. CH.  L. REV.
775,  789  (2001)  (defending  Bush  on  the ground  that  it brought  "an  end to  the  destructive  partisan
struggle...  that...  threatened to  spiral out of control,"  rather  than  on  the basis of the  Court's  legal
reasoning);  Paul A. Gigot, Liberals Discover the Tyranny of the Courts, WALL ST. J., Dec.  15, 2000,  at
A16  (noting that "having turned the Supreme  Court into a superlegislature,  the  left is now  horrified to
see  what  it's  created"  and  defending the decision  on  the  ground  that "it  saved the country  another
month  of fighting before reaching  the same result");  Charles  Krauthammer,  Defenders of the Law....
WASH.  PosT,  Dec.  15, 2000, at A41  (defending Bush on the ground that Democrats "turned  this into a
lawyers'  contest" and that the Court averted "a true constitutional  crisis");  David G.  Savage & Henry
Weinstein, 'Right to  Vote' Led Justices to 5-4 Ruling, L.A. TIMs, Dec.  14,  2000, at Al  (reporting the
views of lawyer Carter Phillips,  who  defended  the result but not  the  reasoning of Bush, and  of law
professor  John Yoo, who  agreed  with the  result but was "surprised"  by the equal protection rationale
subscribed to by the five conservative Justices);  Fred Barbash, A Brand  New  Game, WAsH. POsT,  Dec.
17,  2000,  at  BI  (conceding  that  the  decision  may have  been  "poorly  reasoned"  or  attributable  to
"partisan motives," but denying that this makes it "illegitimate,"  and noting that Democrats frequently
have embraced judicial activism). Few conservative  commentators have undertaken the onerous burden
of defending  Bush  on  its merits.  For a rare  example of such  a  defense,  see  Michael  W. McConnell,
Two-and-a-HaIf  Cheers  for Bush v. Gore, 68 U.  CHI. L. REv.  657 (2001).
24.  See Michael  J. Kiarman,  Constitutional  Fetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85
VA.  L.  REv.  631,  654-55  (1999)  (arguing  that,  in  light  of the  "legal  indeterminacy"  surrounding
impeachment,  "it  is  natural  and  perhaps  inevitable  that  the personal  values  of the interpreters  will
determine legal outcomes").
25.  See id. at 631-50.
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v. Gore was importantly different because the constitutional law relevant to
adjudicating that dispute  was reasonably  clear;  the majority  simply chose
not  to follow  it.  While  the Clinton  impeachment  controversy  illustrates
partisan  preferences  dictating  the  resolution  of  constitutional  indetermi-
nacy, Bush v. Gore reveals partisan preferences trumping law.
This  is a strong claim, though I believe it is one with which virtually
all Democratic  lawyers, and a fair number of Republican ones, will agree.
A closer look at the reasoning of the majority  and concurring opinions  in
Bush will determine whether this serious charge is a fair one.
The per curiam opinion, representing the views of the five conserva-
tive Justices,  relies  on two bases for its  reversal  of the Florida  Supreme
Court's  decision  ordering  a  statewide  manual  recount  of presidential
"undervotes,"  those ballots for which the voting machines could not ascer-
tain the voter's intention, but a manual inspection might. First, the majority
rules  that a  manual  recount  of improperly-marked  ballots,  if conducted
pursuant to standards  no more precise than ascertaining  the "intent of the
voter,"  would  violate  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  of the  Fourteenth
Amendment.  The principal  objection,  according  to the majority, was  the
risk that identical ballots,  from different counties  or  even from the same
county,  might be evaluated  differently. 26  Specifically,  punch  card ballots
with partially detached  chads  or indented chads  might be counted by  one
counting team based on its interpretation of the "intent of the voter" stan-
dard, but not by another applying a disparate interpretation.
Second, the majority ruled that a remand to the Florida Supreme Court
for an opportunity to devise more precise, uniform  standards  to guide the
manual recount, which might alleviate any equal protection concerns, was
impossible because of looming time constraints.  Specifically, Bush v. Gore
was handed down roughly two hours before midnight on December  12, the
day  on  which  resolution  of the  election  contest  had  to be  completed  if
Florida's  slate of presidential electors was to enjoy the "safe harbor"  from
congressional  challenge  afforded by federal  statute. Neither  aspect of the
majority opinion is persuasive.
The majority's  equal  protection  rationale  creates  entirely new  law.2 7
Never before had the Supreme  Court (and perhaps not any other court ei-
ther) intimated that application of a vague statutory standard like "intent of
26.  Bush, 531  U.S.  at  104-07.  This  is not  the only  equality  concern  the majority  raises.  The
majority suggests that limiting a manual recount to undervotes (and excluding overvotes) and that using
untrained personnel as vote counters also raised equal protection concerns. Id. at 107-10.
27.  The plethora  of states  employing  the "intent  of the voter"  standard  in  a  wide  variety  of
contexts, including manual recounts  and the counting  of write-in and absentee ballots, no doubt were
surprised to learn that they have been acting unconstitutionally all along. For these state laws, see Bush,
531  U.S. at 124 n.2 (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting).  See also Brief of Respondent  at 36, Bush  v. Gore,  531
U.S. 98  (2000) (No.  00-949)  (noting that before  voting machines were  invented, the  "intent  of the
voter"  standard was universally employed).
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the voter"  in  a  manual recount  violated  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  be-
cause  of the risk that identically marked  ballots  might be  counted  differ-
ently.2  Of course,  to say that Bush v.  Gore  creates new  equal  protection
law is not to say that it is wrong (except, of course, for Justice Scalia, who
is  on  record  as  rejecting  novel  constitutional  interpretations  that  forbid
longstanding  practices). 2 9  The  Supreme  Court  often  is  called upon  to  re-
solve novel  constitutional  controversies,  and inevitably on such occasions
it creates  new  law. The majority's  equal protection  rationale is  objection-
able not because it represents new law, but rather because it represents bad
law-law  that the conservative  Justices  almost  certainly  would  have  re-
jected in any other setting.
For starters, on the majority's own standard-that  identically-marked
ballots  in different counties  must be  treated the same-the  Florida presi-
dential  election  plainly  was  unconstitutional,  since  identically-marked
military absentee  ballots were  counted  in  some  Republican-leaning  coun-
ties,  notwithstanding their failure  to comply with state  law,  but were  re-
jected  in  other  counties."  Moreover,  if it violates  the  Equal  Protection
Clause to conduct  a manual recount under a vague standard that might re-
sult in identical  ballots being  counted differently,  then certainly  it should
be  unconstitutional  to  use  different  ballot  designs  or  different  ballot-
reading technologies,  if these yield  substantially different  likelihoods  of a
particular vote being  counted.31  Studies have  shown  that undervotes  were
28.  See Brief of Respondent at 44-45,  Bush v. Gore (noting the prevalence  of the "intent  of the
voter" standard  and listing numerous judicial decisions applying it). It is worth pointing out that had the
Florida Supreme  Court prescribed a more specific formula  for ascertaining the "intent of  the voter,"  the
conservative  Justices  probably would have ruled  that the state  court was changing  state law and thus
violating Article  II.  Bush,  531  U.S.  at  105  (refusing  to decide  whether the state  supreme  court  had
authority under state statute to prescribe a more specific standard for manually counting votes); see also
Gore v.  Harris, 773  So. 2d 524,  526 (Fla.  2000) (per curiam)  (noting that a more expansive definition
"would  have raised an issue as to whether this Court would be substantially rewriting the Code after the
election");  Elizabeth Garrett, Institutional  Lessons for the 2000 Presidential  Election,  29 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV.  (forthcoming  2001)  (manuscript  at  14)  (noting  that  the  state  supreme  court  "did  not  feel
comfortable  specifying  substandards  to  discern  voters'  intent  in a  manual  recount"  because  of the
Article Il concerns expressed by the Supreme  Court in Bush 1).
29.  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996)  (Scalia, J., dissenting);  Rutan v.
Republican Party of Illinois, 497  U.S. 62, 95 (1990)  (Scalia, J.,  dissenting).
30.  David Von Drehle et al., For  Bush Camp, Some Momentum from a Memo, WASH.  POST,  Jan.
31,  2001, at Al.
31.  See, e.g.,  Samuel  Issacharoff, Political  Judgments, 68  U.  CHi.  L.  REV.  637,  650  (2001).
Justice Souter,  who disagreed  with most aspects of the majority and concurring  opinions, agreed that
standardless manual recounts were "wholly arbitrary," and thus unconstitutional. Bush, 531  U.S. at  134
(Souter, J.,  dissenting).  Unlike  the  majority,  Souter  did proffer  an  explanation  for why  standardless
recounts  were constitutionally  distinguishable  from the use of disparate voting mechanisms  likely to
yield different rates of nonvotes. Souter argued that local variety in the use of voting technology could
be justified on  the grounds of cost concerns, the desire for experimentation, and so forth. Standardless
manual recounts,  on the other hand,  were simply arbitrary. While  Souter purports  to find  the Florida
manual recount unconstitutional  on the basis of a minimum  rationality standard, this is not the way that
standard  generally has been applied by the Court. See, e.g., Minnesota  v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
449  U.S.  456,  466  (1981)  (noting  that the  Equal  Protection  Clause  requires  only  that a  legislature
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five times more likely in Florida counties using punch-card ballots than in
those  using  more  modem,  optical-scan  ballots. 3"  Similarly,  a potentially
confusing  "butterfly"  ballot  employed  by Palm  Beach  County  led  to  a
much higher-than-normal  rate of presidential  overvotes,  as  did ballots  in
other counties that listed presidential candidates  on two separate  pages. 3 3
Moreover, these county-to-county disparities in presidential undervotes and
overvotes were correlated with race; heavily Black precincts across Florida
were  more likely to use antiquated  voting equipment,  which substantially
increased the chances of ballots failing to register a vote in the presidential
election.4
One principal objective of the court-ordered manual recount in Florida
was the amelioration of inequalities that resulted from the use of disparate
voting technologies  in different counties.  Yet, the Bush majority does not
rationally could have concluded that a particular law serves a legitimate state purpose, not that it in fact
does so);  Williamson  v. Lee  Optical,  348 U.S. 483,  487-89  (1955)  (noting that  minimum rationality
review  is satisfied  so long as the legislature reasonably might have concluded  that a certain  problem
was worth addressing and that its chosen solution might be effective). Furthermore,  it is not difficult to
conjure  possible explanations  for a court  (or legislature)  declining to  specify standards  more  specific
than "the intent of the voter" to guide  a manual recount.  First, the same value in experimentation  that
Souter identifies  with  regard to  voting  machines  seems  to  apply  in  the  context of vote  tabulation
standards.  The  best  way  to  decide  upon  the  optimal  standard  might  be  for  different  counties  to
experiment with different  standards and then compare notes. Second, "local variety"  also might justify
leaving it to county canvassing  boards to use their discretion in defining more precise  standards.  It is
easy to  imagine  the  desirability  of applying  a  different  standard  in  evaluating  ballot  markings  in
precincts with lots of elderly voters, who might experience greater difficulty punching  out chads. This
sort  of imagined  justification  is  all  that  minimum  rationality  review  generally  requires.  See,  e.g.,
McGowan  v. Maryland,  366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)  ("A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if
any state of facts reasonably  may be conceived to justify it.").  Finally, the Florida court's refusal  to
prescribe a more  specific standard  is compellingly justified by its desire not to transgress  on the state
legislature's prerogatives  with regard  to the  selection  of presidential  electors.  For the state courts to
prescribe  a  standard  more  specific  than the  legislature's  "intent  of the voter"  would  have  invited
Supreme Court reversal  on Article H1  grounds. Under these circumstances,  it was not "wholly arbitrary"
for the Florida Supreme Court to refrain from prescribing more specific standards.
32.  Ford Fessenden,  Contesting the Vote:  The  Voting Machines, N.Y.  TMuas,  Dec.  1, 2000,  at
A29;  see also Bush,  531  U.S.  at  147  (Breyer,  J.,  dissenting)  (noting that  voters  in counties  with
different  voting  machines  arrived  at  the  polls  "with  an  unequal  chance  that  their  votes  will  be
counted");  id. at 126 n.4 (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting) (noting that the percentage of "nonvotes,"  meaning
undervotes and overvotes combined, in Florida counties using punch card ballots was  3.92%, while the
same rate in counties using optical scan technology was only 1.43%).
33.  See, e.g.,  Dan  Keating, Democrats Had Most Voided  Votes in Fla., WAsH.  POST,  Jan.  27,
2001,  at Al; Theodore M. Porter, It's Not in the Numbers, WAsH.  POST, Nov. 26, 2000, at B1; see also
Jeffrey Rosen,  Speed Kills Misjudge, Nv  REPUBLIC,  Nov. 27, 2000, at  17 (noting that Bush's equal
protection argument would render the butterfly ballot unconstitutional).
34.  John Mintz, Florida  Ballot Spoilage Likelier  for Blacks, WASH.  PoST, Dec.  3,  2000, at Al;
David Montgomery,  Simmering Election Anger Incites Rights Leaders, WASH.  Posr,  Jan.  5, 2001,  at
Al0; see also Keating, supra  note 33,  at Al  (noting that Republican-leaning  counties were more likely
to use modem vote-counting technology that reduced the likelihood of overvotes  by alerting voters  of
the problem before they left the voting booth).
35.  Bush, 531  U.S. at  147  (Breyer,  J.,  dissenting); see also Rosen,  supra note 33,  at  17  ("By
preventing states from correcting the counting errors that result from different voting technologies, the
conservatives  have precipitated  a  violation  of equal  treatment  far larger than  the one  they  claim toCALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
deign to explain why these  other ostensible  equal  protection problems  do
not invalidate  the entire Florida presidential election vote (or, for that mat-
ter, the entire  nationwide  presidential  election, given  that other states  ex-
hibit the  same  lack of uniformity  in  the  way  they  conduct  presidential
elections).36 All the majority says with regard to these seemingly analogous
equal protection  difficulties is that its holding is limited to "the special in-
stance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single  state judicial
officer,"37  and that  "[t]he  question before the  Court  is not whether  local
entities,  in the exercise  of their expertise,  may develop  different systems
for implementing elections."3  Why was that question not before the Court?
Because,  "[o]ur  consideration  is  limited to the present  circumstances,  for
the problem of equal  protection  in election  processes  generally  presents
many complexities."' 39  So much for the requirement that courts  engage  in
"reasoned  elaboration."4  No interpretation of the Equal  Protection Clause
that invalidates  the manner in which all states currently  conduct  elections
can be a sensible one; the majority's rationale in Bush does just that.
The Court's  equal protection rationale  was  so  novel  and far-fetched
that Bush's lawyers  came exceedingly close to not even bothering to  raise
it.4  When they did, moreover, it was treated very much as an afterthought,
receiving less than two sentences of attention at the very end of a forty-five
page brief in the Florida Supreme  Court. 42 I do not mean to suggest that a
lawyer's  failure to raise  a particular legal argument, or her decision to  in-
voke it  almost as an afterthought,  proves  that the argument  is a bad  one.
Lawyers,  like  everyone  else,  sometimes  make  mistakes  and
avoid."); Akhil Reed Amar, Should We Trust Judges?, L.A. TIMES,  Dec.  17,  2000, at M1  ("In fixating
on the  small glitches of  the recount rather than on the large and systemic glitches of the machines,  the
justices turned a blind eye to the real inequality staring them in the face .... ").
36.  See, e.g., Savage & Weinstein, supra note 23, at Al  (quoting law professor David Cole to the
effect  that the  majority's  equal  protection  rationale  means  that  "every  state  electoral  system  in  the
country  is in  violation,"  and reporting  law professor  Pamela  Karlan  making  a similar  point); Amar,
supra note 35,  at M1 (noting that throughout the country different  counties used  different ballots and
different counting standards).
37.  Bush, 531  U.S. at  109.
38.  Id.
39.  Id.
40.  For  the  idea  that  courts  are  obliged  to  engage  in  "reasoned  elaboration"  and  to  invoke
"neutral  principles"  to justify their decisions,  see,  for example,  HENRY  M.  HART, JR.  & ALBERT  M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS  164-70 (1958);  Wechsler, supra  note 8, at 11-12, 15-17.
41.  James V. Grimaldi & Roberto Suro, Risky Bush Legal Strategy Paid  Off, WASH.  PoST,  Dec.
17, 2000, at A32 (noting that the equal protection argument  was "initially thought so weak" that Bush's
lawyers thought it did not raise a substantial  federal question); see also David Von Drehle, In Florida,
Drawing the Battle Lines, WASH.  PosT, Jan. 29,  2001, at Al  (noting serious  divisions within the Bush
camp and among Republican lawyers more generally as to whether the equal protection argument  was
even worth raising).
42.  See Amended  Brief for Appellees at 45, Gore  v. Harris,  772  So. 2d  1243  (Fla.  2000) (No.
SCOO-243 1);  see also Brief for  Respondents  at 35,  Bush v. Gore  (noting that petitioners  raised their
equal protection challenge  to standardless  recounts in just "one  throwaway line"  in the state  supreme
court).
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miscalculations.  Still, there  is a sense  in which the ex  ante calculation  of
lawyers  as to what qualifies  as  a good legal  argument  is more  revealing
than the Court's post hoc  determination.  The  Supreme  Court enjoys such
immense prestige that the conclusion by a majority of Justices that "x" is a
good legal argument  almost conclusively proves  it to be so.43 Yet, unless
we are to stipulate that the Court is not only "final"  but also "infallible," 4
it must be that the Justices occasionally vindicate bad legal arguments. Be-
cause of this tendency of Supreme  Court decisions  retrospectively to vali-
date the arguments  upon which they are based, the ex  ante judgments  of
lawyers-at least highly proficient ones, possessed of adequate  incentives
to  raise  all  credible  arguments-may  be  more  reliable  indicia  of what
counted as a good legal argument at a particular point in time than are the
Court's post hoc  determinations.  In this  same  sense, the nearly-universal
conclusion  of legal  academics  and political pundits,  before  the  Supreme
Court granted review on the second go-round in Bush, that no serious fed-
eral  question  existed  indicates  how  farfetched  the  ultimately  victorious
equal protection  argument  was. 5  Given  the  skepticism  that  these  same
conservative  Justices  elsewhere  have  evinced  toward  equal  protection
challenges  to  state political  processes,46  their willingness  to intervene  in
Bush would not have been easy to predict.
43.  See, e.g., Balkin,  supra  note  17,  at 1444 (arguing that if"a handful of Supreme Court Justices
thought that these arguments are not only plausible but convincing," they cannot be completely "off the
wall");  Michael  Perry,  The  Authority  of Text,  Tradition, and Reason: A  Theory  of Constitutional
"Interpretation,  " 58  S.  CAL.  L. REv.  551,  566  (1985)  ("[Just]  about  any choice  a  majority of the
Supreme Court is likely to make would probably fall within [the] boundary [set by] accepted canons of
judicial behavior, even in conjunction with the constitutional text.").
44.  See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540  (1953)  (Jackson, J., concurring).
45.  See, e.g.,  William  Kristol & Jeffrey Ball, Against Judicial  Supremacy, WKIY.  STANDARD,
Dec. 4, 2000, at  10 (noting that "[ilt would.  ..  be a mistake...  for Bush to put too much hope in the
federal courts" because "[miost GOP-appointed judges will vote as federalists, for the right of states to
prevail  on election  law,"  and  thus  vill reject the  equal protection  argument);  Charles Lane,  Bush's
Appeal to High Court  Raises Issue of Fairness,  WAsH. PosT, Nov. 23, 2000, at A29 ("Even Republican
lawyers  who  sympathize  with  Bush's  case  express  doubt  about  the  Bush  campaign's... [equal
protection]  claim.");  Editorial, The Election Road Narrows, N.Y. TimEs,  Dec. 5, 2000, at A28  (noting,
after the  initial  Supreme  Court  remand,  that  once  the Florida  Supreme  Court revised  its ruling  to
address  the  Court's Article  II  concern, "there  is unlikely  to be  any  federal  issue that would  warrant
further review by the United States  Supreme Court"); Charles Lane,  Territory  Is Uncharted  for Court
Action, WAsH. Posr, Nov.  10, 2000, at Al  (describing the various state law disputes generated  by the
election and then noting that "[flederal law generally  leaves the administration of elections for federal
office up to the states, so the matter is likely to be settled in Florida's  courts, with no ultimate appeal to
the  U.S.  Supreme  Court');  see also Scott Turow,  No Turning Back From the Dart the  Court Has
Thrown, WAsH.  Posr,  Dec.  17,  2000, at BI  (noting that  constitutional  scholars  "of all stripes"  had
predicted that the Supreme Court would not get involved in the case).
46.  See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer,  478 U.S.  109,  143,  145,  158,  161  (1986)  (O'Connor, J., with
Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist,  J., dissenting) (warning against "the federal judiciary" becoming involved
in  "the most heated  partisan issues,"  denying that the  Equal  Protection Clause  provides  "judicially
manageable  standards" for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims, and denying that "mainstream
political parties" require federal judicial protection).CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
Even  after the majority  identified  an  equal  protection problem with
the "standardless"  recount, however, the ordinary remedy would have been
to remand the case  to the Florida Supreme  Court, to  afford it  an opportu-
nity  to cure the  problem.  Instead,  the per  curiam  opinion concluded  that
such a remedy would be pointless,  since the December  12  "deadline"  for
resolving Florida's election  contest was immediately  at hand.47  The Court
manufactured  this  deadline out of thin air. The  federal  statute identifying
December  12  as a relevant date in the presidential election process plainly
is a "safe  harbor" provision, to be utilized or ignored by the states at their
discretion;  it operates  as  an  instruction  to  Congress,  when  counting  the
states'  electoral votes, not as a command to the states, to be enforced by the
federal courts.48 Nothing in federal law requires that a state's presidential
electors  be  appointed  until  the  date  set for the  electors  to meet and  cast
their votes,  which was  December  18,  on the  2000  election  calendar. The
majority opinion does  not dispute this  point.  Rather,  it reads the Florida
Supreme  Court decision  under  review as  declaring  the  state  legislature's
intention to take  advantage of this federal  safe harbor provision.  Thus,  to
remand Bush to the state court would have been pointless,  according to the
majority, since  under  the  Florida  Supreme  Court's  own interpretation  of
state  law  any manual  recount  had to  be  completed  by the  December  12
deadline. 49
One can only marvel at the disingenuousness  of this conclusion.  First,
there is enormous irony in the Bush majority's eagerness to defer entirely
to the Florida court's supposed conclusion regarding the significance of the
December  12 safe harbor deadline under state election law. Three members
of that majority could identify no other aspect of the state court's interpre-
tation of state election law that warranted similar deference. The majority's
posture on this issue is especially remarkable  given the concurring Justices'
statement that, in light of Article II concerns, "the text of the election  law
itself, and not just its  interpretation  by  the courts  of the  States, takes  on
independent significance."5  The text of Florida election law does not say a
word about the federal safe harbor provision.
Second, to the extent that the Florida Supreme Court did emphasize in
its opinion  the significance  of the December  12  deadline, 5  it plainly was
responding  to the Supreme  Court's  earlier  intervention  in  Bush  v.  Palm
Beach  County  Canvassing Board, 52  which  essentially  had  coerced  the
47.  Bush, 531  U.S.  at  10-11.
48.  See id. at 124  (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 130 (Souter, J.,  dissenting).
49.  Id. at 110. The concurring opinion makes this same point, emphasizing the "wish"  of the state
legislature  to take advantage of the federal  safe harbor provision, a wish that appeared  nowhere in the
statute, but  only in the state supreme  court opinion. Id. at 120-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
50.  Id. at  113 (Rehnquist, C.J.,  concurring).
51.  Gore v. Harris,  772 So. 2d 1243,  1248 (Fla. 2000).
52.  531  U.S. 70(2000).
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Florida court, upon  threat of reversal, to  acknowledge  the importance  of
the  safe  harbor  provision. 3  Thus,  the  Supreme  Court  first  forced  the
Florida jurists to acknowledge the significance  of the December  12 dead-
line, and then insisted that its own hands were tied with regard to permit-
ting the manual recount to continue, given the Florida court's interpretation
of the significance of the December  12 deadline. This is a nifty trick.
Third  and most  importantly,  nothing  in the  Florida  Supreme  Court
opinion, and no sensible reading of state law, treated the December  12 safe
harbor  deadline  as  dispositive,  regardless  of any  competing  considera-
tions.54 It is one thing to say that the Florida legislature would have wished,
all things being equal, to take  advantage of the federal  safe  harbor provi-
sion.  It  is  another  thing  entirely  to  say  that  the legislature  would  have
wanted the availability  of the  safe  harbor provision to trump  any and all
competing  considerations,  such  as ensuring that every  vote be counted.5
The outcome of the 2000 presidential election quite possibly turned on this
aspect of the Bush decision, a rationale that is, to put it bluntly, a complete
fabrication.
A separate concurring  opinion joined by the Court's three most  con-
servative  members,  Chief Justice  Rehnquist,  Justice  Scalia,  and  Justice
Thomas-an  opinion  that  commentators  plausibly  have  suggested  was
originally  designed as the majority  opinion56 -emphasizes  a  different  ra-
tionale for reversing the Florida Supreme Court and terminating the manual
recount. 57 According to these Justices, Article II of the Constitution, which
provides  that  state  legislatures  shall  determine  the  manner  of selecting
presidential  electors, forbids any state court interpretation of state election
law that departs from the legislative design. Chief Justice Rehnquist identi-
fies several ways in which (he believes) the Florida Supreme Court's deci-
sion  ordering  a  statewide  manual  recount  impermissibly  distorts  state
election law. 8
The concurring  opinion  charts  new territory,  since this  provision  in
Article II has generated only one prior Supreme Court interpretation, which
is not even directly relevant  to Bush. 9  To say that the concurring opinion
53.  Id. at 78  (noting that "a legislative wish to take advantage of the 'safe  harbor'  would counsel
against  any construction of the Election Code that Congress might deem to be  a change in the law").
Nothing  in the Florida  election code expresses such a  "wish,"  and even if it did, it is hard to fathom
which statutory interpretations this insight would "counsel against,"  given that state courts engaging in
statutory interpretation presumably always are trying to identify correctly the legislature's intention.
54.  See, e.g.,  Gore v. Harris,  773  So. 2d 524, 528  (Fla. 2000)  (Shaw,  J.,  concurring)  ("[l]n my
opinion, December 12 was not a 'drop-dead'  date under Florida law.").
55.  Bush, 531 U.S. at 149 (Breyer, J.,  dissenting).
56.  See, e.g., Savage & Weinstein, supra note 23, at Al.
57.  Bush, 531 U.S. at  111  (Rehnquist, C.J.,  concurring).
58.  See infra text accompanying notes 102-103.
59.  McPherson  v.  Blacker,  146  U.S.  1 (1892).  The  issue  in McPherson was  whether  a  state
violated Article II by providing  for selection of presidential electors  by popular vote within  electoral
districts,  rather  than at  large.  The  Court  quite  sensibly concluded  that this  scheme  did not  violate
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adopts  a novel construction of Article  II  is,  again,  not necessarily to sug-
gest  that there  is  anything  wrong  with  that  interpretation.  The  relevant
question is whether the interpretation, and its application, is persuasive,  not
whether  it is  novel. It is  also  relevant whether  the interpretive  principles
employed  in that construction  are  reconcilable  with the  general jurispru-
dential  commitments  of the Justices who embraced  it. On neither of these
scores does the concurring opinion pass muster.
The persuasiveness of the concurring opinion's finding of an Article II
violation  depends  on the answer to two  questions.  First, should the stan-
dard by which federal courts review state court interpretations  of state law
be more aggressive than usual in the context of resolving presidential elec-
tion contests? Second, how unreasonable were the Florida Supreme Court's
interpretations  of state election law in Bush? The stronger the case for ag-
gressive review and the more unreasonable the state court's interpretations,
the more persuasive  is the concurring opinion's  determination that Article
II was violated.
As to the standard of review, Chief Justice Rehnquist  begins by con-
ceding that, "[i]n  most cases, comity and respect for federalism  compel us
to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law."60 He goes on
to observe, however,  that because  Article II explicitly  empowers the  state
legislature to select the manner of appointing electors, and because the fed-
eral  safe harbor provision applies  only when the  state election law  was in
place on the day of the election, "the text of the election law itself, and not
just its  interpretation  by the  courts  of the  States,  takes  on  independent
significance."'"  Rehnquist  does  not  go  so  far  as  to  suggest  that federal
courts  should engage  in de novo interpretation of state election  law in the
context  of a  presidential  election  contest.  Indeed,  it  would  be  hard  to
imagine  Rehnquist,  Scalia,  and  Thomas,  Justices  in the  vanguard  of the
1990s  renaissance  of  constitutional  federalism,62  subscribing  to  the
Article  II's injunction that state  legislatures choose the manner of selecting  presidential electors.  The
holding has essentially no relevance to Bush v. Gore, though dicta in the case arguably were relevant to
the issue  in  the Court's first confrontation with the Florida election  dispute.  See Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing  Board, 531  U.S.  70 (2000) (per curiam)  [hereinafter Bush 1].  One of the questions
in Bush I was  whether a  state constitution could cabin a  state legislature's  discretion in providing for
the  manner of selecting  presidential  electors,  id. at  77,  and  dicta  in  McPherson had  answered  that
question in the negative.  146 U.S. at 25.
60.  Bush,  531  U.S.  at  112  (Rehnquist,  C.J.,  concurring).  This  principle  is  about  as  well-
established  as any can be. See Murdock v. Memphis,  87 U.S. (20 Wall.)  590,  635  (1875)  (noting that
with regard to nonfederal  questions,  "we must receive the decision of the state courts as  conclusive");
Commissioner  v. Estate  of Bosch,  387  U.S.  456, 465  (1967)  ("[T]he  state's  highest court is the best
authority on  its own law.").
61.  Bush, 531  U.S. at  113.
62.  See,  e.g., United States  v. Morrison,  529 U.S.  598  (2000) (restrictive  reading of commerce
clause and Section 5 powers);  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706  (1999)  (state sovereign  immunity in state
court); City of Boeme v. Flores,  521  U.S. 507  (1997)  (restrictive reading of Section 5 power); Printz v.
United States, 521  U.S. 898 (1997)  (Tenth Amendment prohibition on  federal commandeering  of state
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proposition that federal courts owe no deference whatsoever to state court
interpretations  of state law,  regardless of the context.  Instead, the concur-
ring opinion argues for reduced deference.
This  is an odd interpretation  of Article  II for these  conservative  Jus-
tices to embrace.  Justices Scalia and Thomas, and to a lesser extent Chief
Justice Rehnquist, ordinarily profess a commitment to an originalist meth-
odology of constitutional interpretation. 6 3 Yet, they provide no evidence in
Bush that the Framers of Article II intended to bolster the role of state leg-
islatures in the selection of presidential electors by constraining state courts
adjudicating contests arising  out of presidential elections  in their ability to
resolve  ambiguities in the meaning of state election law. Nor does the fed-
eral statute implementing Article II (and the Twelfth Amendment),  enacted
after the  1876  election  fiasco,  indicate  any congressional  desire to  have
presidential  election contests adjudicated under  rules different  from those
employed in ordinary state election contests.'
Furthermore, the concurring opinion fails to offer any functional justi-
fication for affording state legislatures federal judicial protection from their
own  state judiciaries.  Even  were  Article  II  sensibly  interpreted  to  offer
such protection, the Florida legislature  has indicated no desire to take  ad-
vantage  of it. That  legislature  adopted a unitary election  code,  generally
applying  the  same  election  contest  rules  to state  and  federal  elections.6"
Indeed, the Florida legislature has  shown itself perfectly  capable  of indi-
cating a preference, when it has one, to avoid judicial resolution of election
contests;  under Florida's  election  code, disputes  involving the election  of
state legislators are to be handled exclusively by the respective houses  of
the  state legislature, not the courts.66  It is plausible  to draw the negative
inference that the Florida legislature intended contests involving presiden-
tial  elections  to be adjudicated  in the  state  courts  according  to the same
rules  that govern  state election  disputes  (excepting those  involving  state
legislators). In other settings, these same Justices have emphasized the im-
portance  of  freeing  states  from  federal  command  with  regard  to  the
executive  officials);  Seminole  Tribe  of Florida  v. Florida,  517  U.S.  44  (1996)  (state  sovereign
immunity in federal court under Eleventh Amendment).
63.  See, e.g.,  Antonin  Scalia,  Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57  U.  CN. L.  REv.  849  (1989);
William Rehnquist, The Notion of  a Living Constitution,  54 Tax. L. REV. 693 (1976); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections  Comm'n,  514  U.S.  334,  370-71  (1995)  (Thomas,  J.,  concurring);  id. at 372  (Scalia,  J.,
dissenting).
64.  Electoral  Count  Act  of 1887,  24  Stat.  373,  3  U.S.C.  § 5  (providing  a  safe  harbor  from
congressional  challenge where a "state shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to [election day],  for
its final determination of  any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of...  [electors] ...  by
judicial or other methods").
65.  Bush, 531 U.S. at 124 (Stevens,  J., dissenting).
66.  FLA. STAT.  ANN. ch.  102.168 (1982  & Supp. 2000).
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structuring  of their own governmental  processes.67  Thus,  it seems  strange
that the concurring opinion would not require a clearer  statement  from the
constitutional text or the Framers'  original understanding before inferring a
constitutional command to federalize the allocation of state decisionmaking
authority in the context of selecting presidential electors.
Offering  neither  originalist  nor  functionalist  support  for their inter-
pretation, the concurring Justices rely entirely on the text of Article II, spe-
cifically  its  reference  to  state  "legislatures"  directing  the  manner  of
choosing presidential electors. This spare textual reference  simply does not
bear the weight the concurrence ascribes  to it. Article I of the Constitution
declares  that "[a]ll  legislative  Powers  herein  granted shall  be vested  in a
Congress  of the United States."68  Yet nobody has ever suggested that this
language precludes judicial interpretation of congressional  statutes. Indeed,
since  1935  the Court never  has  held that this  constitutional  mandate that
Congress  exercise  "[a]ll  legislative  power"  precludes  Congress  from
enacting  vague  (meaningless)  statutes  that  essentially  delegate  the  law-
making  power  to  administrative  agencies  and to  courts.69  Indeed,  some
members of the conservative Bush plurality  are among  the biggest propo-
nents  of the Chevron doctrine,  which  requires  federal  courts  to  defer  to
"reasonable"  agency interpretations  of statutes, notwithstanding the Article
I injunction that Congress "legislat[e]."7  In Bush, Chief Justice Rehnquist
does not explain why broad-ranging judicial and administrative interpreta-
tion of federal statutes is permissible in spite of Article I's requirement that
"[a]ll  legislative powers" be vested in "Congress,"  but Article II's injunc-
tion that state "[legislatures"  direct the manner of appointing presidential
electors  forbids state courts from engaging in ordinary statutory interpreta-
tion of state election law. Thus,  not only does the plurality offer no origi-
nalist or functionalist justification  for its Article  II argument, but its bare
textualist  claim  is  almost  laughable.  It appears  likely that  nobody in the
first two hundred years of the Republic  ever dreamed of this interpretation
of Article II. This probably explains why neither the Bush lawyers, nor the
67.  Cf  Gregory  v.  Ashcroft,  501  U.S.  452,  460  (1991)  (requiring  an  "unmistakably  clear"
statement by Congress before construing  a federal  antidiscrimination  law to apply to a state's judiciary
because it is "[t]hrough the structure of its government ...  [that] a State defines itself as a sovereign").
68.  U.S. CoNsr., Art. I, §1.
69.  The  last Supreme  Court decisions  invalidating federal  legislation  on  nondelegation  grounds
were Panama  Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 288  (1935),  and A.L.A.  Schechter Poultry  Corp.  v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  For a modem illustration of how defunct  the nondelegation  doctrine is, see
Mistretta v. United  States, 488 U.S. 361  (1989).  Last term's decision in  Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc., 531  U.S. 457 (2001), appears to confirm that the doctrine is moribund.  In all  fairness, at
least  the Chief Justice  is on  record  as favoring  a reinvigoration  of this  doctrine. See,  e.g.,  Industrial
Union  Dep't v. American Petroleum  Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 672-76 (1980)  (Rehnquist, J.,  concurring).
70.  See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers  Union, 484  U.S.  112,  133-34 (1987)
(Scalia, J.,  concurring, with  Rehnquist, C.J.);  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,  480 U.S.  421,  453-55  (1987)
(Scalia,  J.,  concurring);  Antonin  Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations  of Law,
1989 DuKE  L.J. 511.
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Justices themselves,  thought to raise the Article  II  ground when  the first
Florida Supreme Court decision was appealed to the High Court, focusing
instead on the palpably erroneous federal statutory argument. 71
Chief Justice Rehnquist seeks to bolster the flimsy Article II argument
by observing that there are other "areas  in which the Constitution requires
this Court to undertake an independent, if still deferential,  analysis of state
law."72 The Chief Justice plainly is correct about the existence  of instances
in which the Supreme Court has rejected state court interpretations  of state
law. Federal rights often become entwined with questions of state law, and
state judiciaries would be able to obstruct implementation of those rights if
their own interpretations  of state  law were  immune from federal review. 73
Consider  a few examples.  State law determines  whether a contract exists,
which  is  a necessary  predicate  for  a violation  of Article  I,  Section  10,
which forbids  state impairment  of the  obligation  of contract.74  Similarly,
state law determines  whether  a property right exists,  which is a necessary
predicate  for the finding of an uncompensated  taking, in violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth  Amendments. 75 Whether retroactive  criminal punish-
ment has been imposed, in violation of the Ex  Post Facto or Due Process
Clauses,  depends  on whether state criminal law has changed since the de-
fendant committed the alleged  transgression,  which turns partly  on a de-
termination  of what state  law was  before  the  defendant  acted.76  Finally,
because  the  Supreme  Court  will  not  decide  a  federal  question  when
"adequate and independent"  state grounds exist to sustain a state court rul-
ing, vindication  of federal rights that are raised  in state court proceedings
depends  on  compliance  with state procedural  law.77  The adequacy  of the
71.  See David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore:  "hat Were They  Thinking?, 68 U.  CMi.  L. REv. 737,
744-46 (2001).
72.  Bush, 531  U.S. at 114,  115 & n.1  (Rehnquist,  C.J., concurring)  (citing NAACP  v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson,  357 U.S. 449 (1958),  Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964),  and Fairfax's
Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch  603 (1813)).
73.  See, e.g.,  PErER W. Low  & JOHN  C.  JEFFRIES,  JR.,  FEDRAL CouRTrs  AND THE  LAw  OF
FEDERAL-STATE  RELATIONS  82 (4th ed.  1998) ("[If  there were no limits on the freedom of state courts
to determine whether a contract had been created and the nature of its obligations, the federal  limitation
might be easily evaded.").
74.  See, e.g.,  Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95,  100  (1938). The Court stated
On such  a  question [of whether  there is a  contract],  one  primarily of state law,  we accord
respectful  consideration  and great weight to the views  of the  State's  highest court  but,  in
order that the constitutional mandate may not become  a dead letter, we are bound to decide
for ourselves  whether a  contract was  made, what are its terms  and conditions, and whether
the State has, by later legislation,  impaired its obligation.
Id. at 100.
75.  See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.  1003,  1032 n.18 (1992)  (noting
that the Court will defer only to "an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents" defining
the property right).
76.  See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347  (1964).
77.  See, e.g., Murdock v. Memphis,  87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
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state  ground of decision  depends  partly on  its  not having  been invented
post hoc to defeat the posited federal right.78
Thus,  the  concurring  opinion  correctly  observed  that  the  Supreme
Court  occasionally  has  rejected  state court  interpretations  of state  law  in
order to protect federal rights. Yet the rule generated by these cases seems
to be one requiring  evidence of bad faith by the state  courts  in their inter-
pretation of state law. All three of the Supreme Court precedents  cited by
the concurring opinion on this score  involved situations where  state courts
had manifested, beyond  a shadow of a doubt, the willingness to  defy fed-
eral  law. 79  A closer  look at the two modem cases  invoked by the concur-
ring  opinion  reveals  how  little  support  they  provide  for  federal  court
intervention in Bush v. Gore.
8 0
In NAACP  v. Alabama, 8  the  Supreme  Court ruled that the NAACP
had a First Amendment right to refuse  to disclose its membership  lists to
Alabama  authorities.  Before  reaching the merits of the  case,  though,  the
Justices  first  had to  decide  whether  the  federal  constitutional  claim  was
procedurally barred. The Alabama Supreme  Court had refused to consider
the First Amendment claim on its merits, because of the Association's fail-
ure to follow the correct procedural path  for securing  state  supreme court
review of its contempt citation for refusing to disclose its membership  lists.
Specifically,  the state court  ruled that the NAACP  should have  sought a
writ of prohibition rather than a writ of mandamus.  It is inconceivable that
the Justices'  view of the case, both on the merits  and on the alleged  state
procedural default,  was  uninfluenced by their knowledge  that the  state  of
Alabama, including  its jurists, were  engaged in a project of massive resis-
tance toward Brown v. Board of Education, 82  a fundamental part of which
involved  shutting  down the NAACP's  operations  in the  state. 83  Yet even
setting aside this extrinsic basis for questioning the  good faith of the state
78.  See, e.g.,  NAACP v.  Alabama ex  rel. Patterson,  357 U.S. 449  (1958); see generally Broad
River  Power  Co.  v. South  Carolina,  281  U.S.  537,  540-41  (1930)  ("[l]f there  is  no evasion  of the
constitutional  issue, and the non-federal  ground of decision has fair support, this Court will not inquire
whether the rule applied by the state court  is right or wrong, or substitute its view of what should be
deemed the better rule, for that of the state court.") (citations omitted).
79.  Bush, 531  U.S.  at 140  (Ginsburg,  J.,  dissenting) (noting that the three  cases  invoked by the
concurring opinion were "embedded  in historical contexts hardly comparable to the situation here").
80.  The third case,  as Justice Ginsburg  notes  in dissent, involved  the  Revolutionary era conflict
between  southern  state  legislation  confiscating  Tory  lands  and  federal  treaties  seeking  to  curtail
confiscation.  That conflict led southern state courts to engage in efforts  at nullification no more subtle
than those undertaken by their counterparts in the civil rights era. Bush, 531  U.S. at 139-40 (Ginsburg,
J.,  dissenting) (citing Fairfax's  Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7  Cranch  603  (1813);  Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee,  I Wheat. 304 (1816)).
81.  NAACP v. Alabama  ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
82.  See NuMAN  BARTLEY, THE RIsE OF MAssivE REsIsTANCE  (1969).
83.  See Walter Murphy,  The South Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Laws,  12 W. POL.  Q. 371
(1959).  On  background to NAACP  v. Alabama, see MARK  V.  TUSHNET, MAKING  CIVIL  RIGHTS  LAW
284-89  (1994);  Robert  Jerome Glennon,  The Jurisdictional  Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement,  61
TENN. L. REV. 869, 887-900 (1994).
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court justices  in NAACP,84  the  Supreme  Court  was  able  to  identify  no
fewer than  a half dozen prior Alabama  Supreme  Court decisions that had
rejected precisely  the procedural  distinction  relied upon  by that court  in
NAACP  to justify  its refusal  to reach the merits of the First Amendment
claim.8"  Incredibly,  the  state  supreme  court,  at  an  earlier  stage  of these
same  proceedings,  had  directed  the NAACP's  lawyers  to  seek  appellate
review via the very procedural  route (a writ of mandamus)  that the state
justices later determined to constitute a procedural  default.86 In other civil
rights era cases where the Supreme Court likewise declined to permit state
procedural  defaults  to  block federal  review  of constitutional  claims,  the
Justices also were able to point to earlier state precedents that directly con-
travened the state court's finding of a procedural default in the case under
review."'
Notwithstanding  Chief Justice Rehnquist's  claim that precedents  like
NAACP  v. Alabama were  "precisely parallel" to Bush, 88 he failed to iden-
tify anything even remotely similar in Florida case law that would warrant
the conclusion that the Florida Supreme  Court was  departing from estab-
lished  precedent.  Without  expressly  saying  so,  the  conservative  Justices
implied that the Florida Supreme  Court's statutory interpretations  in Bush
were entitled to no greater deference in federal court than those of renegade
White  supremacist nullifiers  during the civil rights era.89  One might have
expected  that these  Justices would  offer  some  factual  predicate  to justify
this  extraordinary, albeit implicit, aspersion  on the integrity of state court
jurists, 9" but they did not.
The other civil rights era  decision  invoked  as precedent  in Bush  for
upsetting  a state  court's  interpretation  of state  law was  Bouie v.  City of
84.  Most of the  other  leading  cases  rejecting  the  adequacy  of state  procedural  grounds  for
denying federal rights also involve southern  states obstructing the civil rights movement. See,  e.g., Barr
v. City of Columbia, 378  U.S.  146 (1964);  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S.  288 (1964);
Shuttlesworth  v. City of Alabama, 376 U.S.  339  (1964);  Wright v. Georgia, 373  U.S. 284  (1963); see
also Low  & JEF Rias, supra note 73, at  109 ("It is no coincidence  that many such  cases arose  in the
civil rights litigation in the 1960s.");  Glennon, supra note 83, at 887-900.
85.  357 U.S.  at 456 (concluding that "[w]e are unable to reconcile the procedural  holding of the
Alabama Supreme Court in the present case with its past unambiguous holdings").
86.  Id. at 458.
87.  See, e.g.,  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S.  288, 297-300 (1964);  Barr v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S.  146,  149 (1964); see also Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303  U.S.  95,  105-07
(1938)  (rejecting a state court's determination of whether a  contract existed because it conflicted with
numerous earlier decisions of that court).
88.  Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
89.  Bush, 531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens,  J., dissenting) (noting that what must underlie the concurring
Justices'  unwillingness to  defer to the state court's interpretation of state  law "is  an unstated lack of
confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if
the vote count were to proceed").
90.  Id. at  141 (Ginsburg,  J., dissenting) (objecting that the Florida Supreme  Court ought not be
"be bracketed with state high courts of  the Jim Crow South").
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Columbia. 9  That case is equally weak support for the Article II rationale in
Bush, but for a different reason. In Bouie, the question was whether it vio-
lated the Due Process Clause to convict sit-in demonstrators under a crimi-
nal  trespass  statute  that  barred  "entry  on  lands  of another  after  notice
prohibiting  same'' 2 when  the protestors  had been  commanded  to depart,
but not warned against entering in the first place. The Supreme Court ruled
that for the state supreme  court to interpret this statute to cover refusals to
leave  as  well  as  forbidden  entries  "unforeseeably  and  retroactively
expanded" its meaning. 93  In the process of so ruling, the Court had to reject
the  state  court's  implicit  determination  that  the criminal  trespass  statute
always had been  construed  this way. The  Justices were  able to  cite  only
extraneous dicta,  not actual holdings,  in support of their  refutation of the
state court's interpretation of state law.94
The Bouie Court's extraordinarily  stringent interpretation of the notice
requirement imposed by the Due Process Clause,95 and its unwillingness to
defer  to a  state court's  ostensibly  sensible construction  of a  state  statute,
can  be understood  only  in the  context  of the times.  Between  1960  and
1964, the Supreme Court confronted dozens  of cases  in which sit-in dem-
onstrators  were prosecuted  for breach of the peace,  trespass,  and  sundry
other offenses.96  The Justices were disinclined  to affirm the criminal con-
victions of persons  with whose  racial protest they generally  sympathized.
Yet,  they also  were unwilling  to vindicate  the protesters'  principal  legal
claim that the state action necessary  for an  equal protection violation was
present  when  the  state  simply  was  enforcing  background  common  law
property rules. 97  Instead, the Justices identified a wide range of imaginative
(specious)  grounds for reversing the convictions without reaching the fun-
damental constitutional question.9
By  the  time  Bouie  arrived  on  the  Court's  docket,  the  1964  Civil
Rights Act, which would moot the state action issue by creating a federal
statutory  prohibition  on  race  discrimination  in  places  of  public
91.  378 U.S.  347 (1964).
92.  Id. at 349 n. 1 (reproducing the statute).
93.  Id. at 352.
94.  Id. at 356-57.
95.  See, e.g., id. at 363, 367 (Black, J.,  dissenting) (noting that nobody could have been misled by
this construction of the statute).
96.  See, e.g., Thomas  P. Lewis, The Sit-in Cases: Great Expectations, 1963  Sup. CT.  REV.  101;
Monrad G.  Paulsen,  The Sit-in Cases of 1964:  "But Answer Came There None, " 1964 Sup.  CT. REv.
137.
97.  I have described  some  of the internal deliberations  in the sit-in cases,  with  citations  to the
original  documents,  in  Michael  Kiarman,  An  Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90
MICH.  L. REv. 213, 272-76  (1991).
98.  See, e.g.,  Griffin  v. Maryland,  378  U.S.  130  (1964)  (reversing  a trespass conviction  on  the
ground that an arrest by a park employee who  had been deputized  as a sheriff constituted state action);
Garner  v.  Louisiana,  368  U.S.  157  (1961)  (reversing  a  disburbing-the-peace  conviction  on  the due
process  ground of total absence of evidence).
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accommodation, was finally nearing passage, after the longest filibuster in
the history of the United States Senate.99 In that setting, the Justices under-
standably were reluctant to affirm, for the very first time, the conviction  of
a sit-in demonstrator. Thus the Court "invented"  a due process objection to
Bouie's  conviction, rejecting  the state court's view that the state criminal
trespass  statute  always  had  forbidden  refusals  to  depart  after  notice  to
leave, and holding that to interpret the provision this way now represented
an unforeseeable  expansion  of the statute, in violation of the Due Process
Clause. Nobody who teaches criminal law would recognize this conception
of what due  process  notice  requires.'  Leading  criminal  law  casebooks
treat  Bouie as  bad  law,  a  case  that  can  be  accounted  for  only  by  the
Justices'  political  sympathies  for the  civil rights  movement.'0  Thus,  the
only legal principle that Boule genuinely stands for is that sometimes  the
Supreme Court, for political reasons, will decide cases in a lawless fashion.
In one  sense, then, though not the one the conservative  Justices intended,
Bouie was the perfect case for them to cite in Bush.
After laying the groundwork  for reducing  the deference  owed to the
state court's interpretations of Florida law, the concurring opinion proceeds
to enumerate several ways in which that court's interpretations were said to
have violated the legislature's  design.  The concurring  Justices  raised  the
following  objections to the state supreme court decision  in Bush°2:  it de-
prived  the  secretary  of  state's  certification  of  the  election  results  of
"virtually  all legal  consequence"; 1 03  it engaged  in  de novo review  of the
local  canvassing  boards'  decisions  whether to  conduct  manual  recounts
after the certification  deadline;  it eliminated the statutory  grant of discre-
tion to the Secretary of State with regard to waiving the certification dead-
line by ordering the inclusion in the certification  of all recounts completed
during  the  contest phase; it unreasonably  construed  the contest provision
requiring  that  "legal  votes"  not  be  rejected  to  require  the  counting  of
"improperly  marked ballots"; it refused to defer to the Secretary of State's
reasonable interpretations  of state election law, as required  by statute; and
it unreasonably construed the statutory grant to state courts of the power to
99.  HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM,  THE  CIVIL RIGHTS  ERA:  ORIGINS  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OF NATIONAL
POLICY, 1960-1972,  at 151 (1990).
100.  See,  e.g.,  John  Calvin  Jeffries,  Jr.,  Legality,  Vagueness, and the  Construction of Penal
Statutes,  71  VA. L. REv. 189,  211  (1985)  (arguing  that the "core  concept of notice as a requirement of
fairness to individuals"  focuses  on "whether the ordinary  and ordinarily law-abiding individual would
have received some signal that his or her conduct risked violation of the penal law").
101.  See, e.g.,  PETER  Low  ET  AL.,  CIMIAL  LAW:  CASES  AND  MATERIALS  100,  106  (2d ed.
1986)  (speculating  that  "the  Court's  application  of [fair notice]  principles  to the Bouie  facts  was
somewhat  more rigid than  would have been the case  if a  more ordinary  trespass  was involved"  and
noting  that  "the  Supreme  Court  itself  understands  the  context  of  Boute  as  qualifying  its
message,  ...  [since]  ...  Bouie  has  not  become  a  substantial  constraint  on  the  interpretation  of
ambiguities in subsequently construed federal criminal statutes").
102.  Bush, 531 U.S. at 113-23 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
103.  Id. at 118.
2001]CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
issue  "appropriate  relief'  in contest actions  to include a statewide  manual
recount  that could not possibly be  completed  in time  to realize  the  state
legislature's "wish" to take advantage of the federal  safe harbor provision.
It is fair to say that the protest and contest provisions of Florida elec-
tion law are characterized  by significant ambiguity, which for the most part
never  has been  clarified  by the Florida  courts-unsurprisingly,  since the
contest  provisions  were  substantially  overhauled  in  1999."°4  On  many  of
the statutory  interpretation issues raised  in Bush, reasonable  people surely
might differ. 5 Yet none  of the Florida court's  interpretations  are particu-
larly  "peculiar,"' 0 6  and  certainly  none  of them  qualifies  as  "absurd,"'1 0 7
which is how the concurring  opinion  characterizes  them. Florida election
law  clearly contemplates  a  contest to  certified  election  results.  The  sub-
stantive standard that must be established  for the contest to proceed is,  in
relevant part, the "rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change
or place  in doubt the result of the election."' 0 8  Given the closeness  of the
certified  presidential  election  result in Florida,  a margin of 537 votes for
Bush, there is no doubt that the number of undervotes  (estimated at 60,000)
was  sufficient  to  "place  in doubt"  the  election  result.  The  only question
was  whether undervotes  qualify  as "legal  votes."  This was  a  question  of
first impression for the Florida Supreme Court. The state jurists determined
that ballots that clearly express the intent of a voter, but that were marked
in  such a way  that  the  voting machines  could  not read  them,  qualify  as
"legal."'0 9 The  concurring opinion  calls this conclusion  "absurd,"  yet it is
consistent  with  the  way  Florida  courts  historically  have  defined  legal
votes,"0  with explicit  language  in  the Florida election  code requiring that
104.  On the contrast between the new and the old contest provisions, see Gore v. Harris, 772 So.
2d 1243,  1251  n.9 (Fla. 2000).
105.  The  dissenting  opinions  of Justices  Souter  and  Breyer  ably demonstrate  how  the Florida
court's resolutions of all  the relevant  statutory ambiguities  were at least  reasonable. Bush,  531  U.S.  at
130-33  (Souter, J.,  dissenting);  id. at  149-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Several of the points made in this
and the following paragraphs  are also made in those dissenting opinions. For a  strong statement  of the
contrary  view-that the Florida  Supreme  Court "butchered"  the state election  statute,  see Richard  A.
Posner, Florida 2000: A  Legal  and Statistical Analysis  of the Election  Deadlock  and the Ensuing
Litigation, 2000 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
106.  Bush,  531 U.S. at 120 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
107.  Id.  at 119.
108.  FLA.  STAT.  ANN. ch.  102.168(3)(c)  (2000) (1982 & Supp. 2000).
109.  Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1256-57.
110,  See, e.g.,  Boardman v. Esteva, 323  So. 2d 259,  267 (Fla.  1975)  (denying, in the  context of a
challenge to absentee ballots, that there  is any "magic in the statutory requirements,"  and insisting that
the "important"  question  is whether "the will  of the people was effected");  State ex  rel.  Carpenter v.
Barber,  198  So.  49,  50-51  (Fla.  1940)  (concluding  that  a  ballot  shall  be  counted  "if  the  will  and
intention of the voter can be determined,"  even if the voter did not follow  the instructions  for marking
the ballot);  Wiggins  v.  State  ex rel.  Drane,  144  So.  2d 62,  63  (Fla.  1932)  (holding that ballots that
"clearly  indicate the choice of the  voter" must be counted, even if "irregular");  Darby v. State ex rel.
McCollough,  75  So.  411,  412  (Fla.  1917)  (per curiam)  ("Where  a  ballot is  so  marked  as  to plainly
indicate  the voter's  choice  and  intent in placing  his  marks  thereon,  it  should be  counted  as marked
unless some positive provision of law would be thereby violated.").
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the "intent of the voter"  be ascertained with regard to damaged  and defec-
tive ballots,"'  and with the interpretation of numerous  other state supreme
courts.I"  Nor is it clear that the Florida Supreme Court owed any particular
deference  to the Secretary of State's  contrary interpretation,  given the po-
litical nature of her position, the absence of any obvious agency "expertise"
that would entitle her interpretation to deference, the fact that her interpre-
tation was post hoe rather than a product of ex  ante rulemaking,  and the
generally uncertain standard of judicial deference to agency legal interpre-
tations called for by Florida administrative law." 3
I1l.  FLA.  STAT.  ANN.  ch.  101.5614  (5) (1982  & Supp. 2000)  (providing  that no ballot shall be
disregarded "if there  is a clear  indication  of the intent of the voter as determined by  the canvassing
board");  see  also  id. §102.166  (7) (specifying  procedures  for  a  manual  recount,  which  include
counting teams and, if necessary, county canvassing boards seeking "to determine a voter's intent").
112.  See, e.g., In re Election of U.S. Representative  for Second Congressional Dist., 653 A.2d 79,
90-91  (Conn. 1994)  (rejecting the view that legal votes are only those complying strictly with the ballot
instructions and instead counting all ballots upon which "the intent of the voter'  is apparent "in light of
all of the available evidence disclosed by the ballot");  Duffy v. Mortensen,  497 N.W.2d 437, 439 (S.D.
1993) (holding that a punch card ballot with two comers of the chad detached must be counted, since
the voter's intent could be discerned,  and "the policy of the state is to count  each person's vote in an
effort to determine the true and actual intent of the voters");  Pullen v. Mulligan,  561 N.E.2d  585, 611
(I11.  1990)  (holding that "voters should not be disfranchised where their intent may be ascertained with
reasonable  certainty,  simply  because  the chad  they punched  did  not  completely  dislodge  from  the
ballot");  Fischer v. Stout,  741  P.2d 217, 221  (Alaska  1987)  (holding that punch-card ballots marked
entirely in pen and pencil are legal votes, "because they provided clear evidence of the voters'  intent");
Wright v. Gettinger, 428 N.E.2d  1212,  1225 (lId. 1981)  (affirming trial court's judgment that ballots
with "hanging chads"  could be counted, since "the intention of the voter could clearly be  discerned");
McCavitt v. Registrar of Voters of Brockton, 434 N.E.2d  620, 624-25  (Mass.  1982)  (holding that the
court  must  ascertain  the intent  of the voters  with  regard  to  punch  card ballots  that have  not  been
punched through sufficiently for the machine to count them); Escalante v. City of Hermosa Beach,  241
Cal. Rptr. 199,201-03 (Cal. App.  1987).
113.  For a concise  summary  of the conflicting approaches  that Florida  courts  have taken on  the
question of how much deference courts owe to agency legal interpretations, see David M. Greenbaum
& Lawrence E. Sellers, Jr.,  1999 Amendments to the Florida  Administrative Procedure  Act:  Phantom
Menace or Much Ado About Nothing?, 27 FLA. ST. L. REv. 499, 522-24  (2000). Compare Krivanek v.
Take  Back Tampa Political Comm.,  625  So. 2d 840,  844  (Fla.  1993)  ("although not binding judicial
precedent, advisory opinions of affected agency heads are persuasive authority and, if the construction
of  law in those opinions is reasonable,  they are entitled to great weight in construing the law as applied
to that affected agency  of government"), and State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative  Servs. v. Framat
Realty, Inc., 407 So. 2d 238, 242 (Fla. App.  1981)  (according a "most weighty presumption of validity"
to  agency rulemaking),  with Tampa Electric  Co. v. Garcia,  767  So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2000)  (per curiam)
(showing  no deference  to  an  agency's  legal  interpretation),  and Legal  Envtl.  Assistance  Found. v.
Board  of  County  Comm'rs,  642  So.  2d  1081,  1083-84  (Fla.  1994)  (refusing  to  defer  to  an
"unreasonable"  interpretation);  see also Darby v. State ex rel.  McCollough,  75  So. 411  (Fla.  1917)
(showing no deference to local election officials'  interpretation of what counts as a legal vote). For the
rule  that only  interpretations implicating  an agency's  expertise  warrant  deference,  see,  for example,
Zopfv. Singletary, 686  So. 2d 680, 682 (Fla. App.  1996); Board of Trustees. v. Dep't of Mgmt. Servs.,
651  So. 2d  170, 173  (Fla. App.  1995). For the rulemaking requirement, see FLA. STAT.  AmN.  ch. 120.54
(1995  & Supp. 2001).  For the willingness  of Florida courts to show greater deference  to agency legal
interpretations  that  flow  from  rulemaking,  as  opposed  to  post hoc  adjudication,  see,  for  example,
Florida Cities Water Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 384 So. 2d 1280,  1281  (Fla.  1980); Anheuser-
Busch,  Inc.  v. Dep't of Bus. Regulation,  393  So.  1177,  1182 (Fla. App. 1981). I am grateful  to  Jim
Rossi for directing me to relevant sources and for helping to clarify Florida administrative law for me.CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
The  contest  provisions  of the  Florida election  code  do  not  disclose
what level of deference  is owed to the Secretary of State's certification  of
election  results,  or to  local  canvassing  boards'  decisions  not  to conduct
manual recounts.  Since the very purpose of an election  contest is to chal-
lenge the certification, it makes no sense to have  a contest provision while
deferring entirely to the certification. The statutory standard for a contest to
proceed, "rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place
in doubt the results of the election,"  does not indicate that any deference  at
all  is owed  to  the decisions  of administrative  officials.  Perhaps  de  novo
review  is  not the  most  sensible  way  of  structuring  an  election  contest
scheme, but it is perfectly consistent with the statutory language,  which the
concurring  opinion  emphasizes  is  entitled  to  special  weight  in  light  of
Article  II  concerns." 4 Nor does it  contravene  any Florida Supreme  Court
precedent,  since that court never before had interpreted the amended con-
test provisions.  A Florida intermediate  appellate  court, construing  the old
contest provision,  had ruled that the same deference  explicitly granted  by
statute  to local  canvassing  boards  with  regard  to conducting  manual  re-
counts  during the protest phase  should  apply during  the contest  phase,"5
but that ruling  is not precedent for the  state supreme court.  Moreover,  to
overrule in the contest phase of the proceedings  a local canvassing board's
discretionary judgment during  the protest phase not  to conduct  a manual
recount does not nullify the statutory  grant of discretion;  rather, it restricts
its force  to elections  that are  not so  close  at the  state  level  as to raise  a
doubt  whether  uncounted  lawful  votes  might  change  the  election  out-
come.16 Thus,  the Florida Supreme Court's decision to engage in  de novo
review of Vice President  Gore's request for manual recounts  is  consistent
with  the  statutory  contest  language,  not  inconsistent  with  any  binding
Florida precedent,  and reconcilable  with a  statutory  grant of discretion  to
local canvassing boards not to conduct manual recounts at the protest phase
of election proceedings. In what alternate universe does such an interpreta-
tion of Florida election law qualify as "absurd"?
Having  found  the  statutory  contest  standard  satisfied,  the  Florida
Supreme  Court ordered  a  statewide  manual  recount,  notwithstanding  the
shortness  of time. The  court relied  on the statutory provision  authorizing
114.  It is ironic, given the concurring  opinion's emphasis  on the text of the  Florida election code,
that it was the Bush camp arguing against a literal, and in favor of a holistic, reading of the statute. See,
e.g.,  Brief for  Petitioners  at  20,  Bush  (No.  00-949)  (noting  that  the  Florida  legislature  "enacted  a
carefully crafted statutory  scheme");  id. at 23  (arguing that the Florida  Supreme  Court's  decision  "is
nothing less than the evisceration of the internal coherence of the legislature's design").
115.  Broward  County  Canvassing  Board  v.  Hogan,  607  So.  2d  508  (Fla.  Ct. App.  1992)  (per
curiam).
116.  Gore  v. Harris,  772  So. 2d  at 1270-71  (Harding,  J.,  dissenting)  (noting that the "abuse  of
discretion" standard  applicable at the protest phase does not apply during the contest phase); Bush,  531
U.S. at 151-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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courts to order "any  relief appropriate"' 1 7 once the threshold requirement
for an  election  contest had  been satisfied.  The  concurring  opinion  states
that this reading of "appropriate  relief'  cannot be reconciled with the leg-
islature's  "wish"  to take  advantage  of the federal  safe harbor  provision.
Yet, as we have seen, the legislature expressed no such wish, and even if it
had, reading  Florida election  law to elevate that wish  over all competing
considerations  would  be  nonsensical. 18  The  Florida  Supreme  Court  or-
dered the statewide manual recount on December 8.  In all likelihood, that
recount would have been  completed by December  12119  had the Supreme
Court not stayed it the morning it began (December  9).120  The recount al-
most certainly would have been  completed by December  18,  the date by
which Florida electors  had  to be appointed  in order to participate  in the
electoral  college  balloting.  There  is  nothing  odd about  construing  "any
relief appropriate"  to  include  a  statewide  manual  recount  that probably
could have been completed in time to avoid jeopardizing  Florida's partici-
pation in the electoral college vote.121
Finally, the Gore team not only had the plain meaning of the statute
on its side, but also the plain tenor of Florida election law precedent. While
the specific statutory interpretation questions raised by the election contest
were not resolved by prior precedent, the one clear principle to be derived
from Florida election cases is that safeguarding the right to vote and ascer-
taining the will of the voter trump more technical questions of compliance
with legal formality. Numerous Florida court decisions have embraced this
proposition.1 2  In  light  of this  background  interpretive  principle,  plainly
established by Florida precedent, the Florida Supreme  Court's ruling that
117.  FLA. STAT.  ANN.  ch. 102.168(8)  (1982 & Supp. 2000).
118.  See supra  text accompanying notes 50-55.
119.  See, e.g., Editorial, Another Roller Coaster Day, WASH. Posr, Dec.  10,  2000, at B6 (noting
that the manual recounts  were "proceeding relatively smoothly and quickly" before the Supreme Court
stayed them).
120.  Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.  1048 (2000).
121.  The concurring opinion notes that even if the manual recount could have been completed by
December  12, "the inevitable legal challenges and ensuing appeals to the Supreme Court of Florida and
petitions for  certiorari to this Court...  could not possibly be completed by that date." Bush, 531 U.S. at
121  (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). It is not obvious that this is true, especially since the relevant  date is
December  18,  not December  12.  But even if it were true, it is not obvious  why  a completed  manual
recount with uncompleted judicial challenges ought not to be preferred to a machine count that clearly
missed thousands of ballots on which the voters'  intention could be discerned.
122.  See, e.g., Krivanek  v. Take Back Tampa Political  Comm., 625  So. 2d 840,  844  (Fla. 1993)
("election laws should generally be liberally construed in favor of an elector"); State ex rel. Chappell v.
Martinez,  536  So. 2d  1007,  1008  (Fla.  1988)  (noting that "the  object of holding an  election"  is "the
electorate's  effecting its will through its balloting, not the hyper-technical compliance  with statutes");
Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 263, 269 (Fla.  1975) (noting that "the right of a citizen to vote" is
more important than  "unyielding adherence to statutory scripture" and "that the primary consideration
in an election contest is whether the will  of the people has been effected");  State  ex rel. Carpenter v.
Barber,  198  So. 49, 51 (Fla.  1940) ("It is the intention of the law to obtain an honest expression of the
will or desire of the voter.").
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presidential undervotes must be examined to ascertain, wherever possible,
the actual intent of the voters was entirely unexceptionable. The barrage  of
criticism leveled by Republican politicos against manual recounts, 2 1  which
was slyly endorsed  by the concurring opinion,12 4  was in fact  a lawless  re-
fusal  to  abide  by either  explicit  statutory  language  authorizing  such  re-
counts'25 or abundant Florida judicial precedent endorsing the principle that
ascertaining the actual intent of voters is the paramount objective  of courts
adjudicating  election controversies.
12 6
Reasonable  people  certainly can disagree  where  to draw  the line be-
tween a merely mistaken interpretation and a manifestly unreasonable one.
Moreover, degrees of unreasonableness are notoriously difficult to quantify
or otherwise measure  objectively. Perhaps, in light of these  considerations,
it was inevitable that Republican  Justices,  like so many Republican politi-
cians  and  voters,  would  conclude  that  the  Florida  Supreme  Court  was
"stealing"  the election from George  W. Bush,2 7 and thus that its statutory
123.  See, e.g., Dexter Filkins, Counting the Vote:  Manual Counts, N.Y. TIMES,  Nov.  16, 2000,  at
A32  (quoting  James  Baker  criticizing  manual  recounts  because  they  "present[]  tremendous
opportunities for human error and indeed for the possibility of mischief');  Edward Walsh, Bracingfor
Court Showdown,  WASH.  PosT, Nov. 20, 2000, at Al  (quoting criticism  of hand recounts by Montana
Governor Mark Racicot); Editorial, Scared ofFlorida  Count, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 21,  2000, at
18A  (describing  Republicans'  assault  on  manual  recounts  as  "distorting,"  "miscounting,"  and
"untrustworthy");  see also Thomas  L. Friedman, Can Gore Ever Win?, N.Y. TIMES,  Nov. 21,  2000, at
A25,  reprinted in  BUSH  v.  GoRE,  supra note  20,  at  187,  188  (noting  the  "wild,  unsubstantiated
allegations that the hand counters are engaged in fraud"  being made by the Bush camp).
124.  Bush,  531  U.S.  at  121  (Rehnquist,  C.J.,  concurring)  (noting  that  the  manual  recount  of
undervotes was "a search  for elusive-perhaps  delusive-certainty").
125.  FLA.  STAT.  ANN.  ch.  102.166  (4)(c)  (1982  &  Supp.  2000);  §102.166(5);  see Michael  W.
McConnell,  Supremely Ill-Judged, WALL ST. J.,  Nov. 24, 2000, at AI6, reprinted in BUSH  v. GORE,
supra note  20,  at  198,  199  ("Despite  their high  potential  for  arbitrariness  and  even  fraud,  manual
recounts,  like deadlines, are a feature of Florida law.").
126.  See supra note  122.
127.  See, e.g.,  David Tell,  The Bush  Victory, WKLY.  STANDARD,  Dec.  25, 2000, at 9 (criticizing
the Florida  Supreme  Court decision as "ridiculous"  and "ghastly");  Nelson Lund, An  Act of Courage,
WK.Y.  STANDARD,  Dec.  25,  2000,  at  19  (accusing  the  Florida  Supreme  Court  of "violat[ing]  the
Constitution"  and blaming it for forcing the Supreme  Court to  intervene);  Robert F. Nagel, From U.S.
v. Nixon to Bush v.  Gore, WKLy.  STANDARD,  Dec. 25, 2000, at 20 (calling the Florida  Supreme  Court
decision  "stunning" and  a product of "intellectual  anarchy");  Michael  S. Greve,  The Real Division in
the Court,  WKaY.  STANDARD,  Dec.  25, 2000, at 28 (noting some doubt as to whether "repeated judicial
attempts to stack the deck in a presidential election do not compare to the moral scandal of Jim Crow");
Krauthammer, supra note 23, at A41 (blaming a "rogue  state supreme  court," which in "an  astonishing
burst  of willfulness,"  created  a  "constitutional  crisis"  because of its  "mission"  to  defeat  George  W.
Bush); Matthew Vita & Juliet Eilperin, Congress Bracesfor  Battle over Electoral Votes, WASH.  PosT,
Nov. 22,  2000, at A19  (quoting House Majority Whip  Tom DeLay accusing  the Democratic  Party  of
"prosecuting a war to reverse the results of a fair, free election by any means necessary" and calling the
Florida Supreme  Court decision "a blatant and extraordinary  abuse of judicial power");  Eiric  Pianin &
Helen  Dewar, Congress  Sits on Political  Powder  Keg, WASH.  Posr, Dec.  10, 2000, at A31  (noting that
DeLay and other congressional Republicans have accused Democrats and Florida's  Supreme Court "of
an effort to steal the election from Bush"). Indeed, the conservative  Justices defended their involvement
by implicitly blaming Gore  for turning to the courts in the first place. Bush, 531  U.S. at  111  ("None are
more conscious  of the vital limits on judicial  authority than are  the Members of this Court ....  When
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interpretations  were  entitled to no  more  deference  than  those  of the Jim
Crow state courts that had manifested a willingness to lie and cheat in or-
der to nullify Brown and obstruct the civil rights movement. It is impossi-
ble to disprove conclusively  these Republican accusations,  especially since
the genuine indeterminacy  of Florida election  law probably made it inevi-
table  that the partisan preferences  of the Florida court's  Democratic  jus-
tices would influence their statutory interpretations  in favor of Al  Gore."'
Yet,  permitting  partisan  considerations  to  influence  the  resolution  of
genuine  legal  ambiguity  is not equivalent  to  "stealing"  an election.  It is
almost  impossible  to imagine Rehnquist,  Scalia, and  Thomas  concluding
that these particular state court interpretations  of state law were "absurd" in
any context other than the one in which George W. Bush's  election to the
presidency hung in the balance.'29 Indeed, in other settings, these three Jus-
tices have insisted that federal courts should defer even to state court inter-
pretations  of federal  law unless  "patently unreasonable."'30  It takes  little
imagination  to  picture  the  impassioned-indeed,  characteristically  vitri-
olic-assault  on judicial  activism  and  federal  overreaching  that  Justice
Scalia might have penned had the candidates  been reversed and it was Al
Gore  asking  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  to resolve  a  presidential
election contest by repudiating  a state court's interpretation of state law.' 3'
II
LONG TERM  CONSEQUENCES
I already  have expressed  doubt  about whether the  Supreme  Court's
institutional  stature and legitimacy depend much,  in the long term,  on the
quality of the legal  reasoning  in its  opinions. 3 2  Rather, the judgment  of
history  seems to depend more  on whether the Court generally reaches the
contending parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it becomes  our unsought responsibility to
resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.").
128.  On  the  other  hand,  in  defense  of the  state  supreme  court,  Florida  precedents  really  do
emphasize the importance  of effectuating the will of the voters in  election contests.  See sources  cited
supra note  122.
129.  Bush, 531  U.S.  at 142-43  (Ginsburg,  J., dissenting) ("Were the other Members of this Court
as mindful as they generally are of our system of dual sovereignty, they would affirm the judgment of
the Florida Supreme Court.").
130.  Wright  v.  \Vest,  505  U.S.  277,  291  (1992)  (Thomas,  J.,  plurality  opinion)  (habeas
proceeding); id. at 371 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also O'Dell v. Netherland, 521  U.S.  151,  156  (1997)
(Thomas, J.) (under Teague,  federal  courts  on habeas  review must defer to state courts'  "reasonable,
good-faith interpretations" of federal court precedent); Sandra  D. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship
Between the Federal and State Courts  from the Perspective of  a State Court Judge, 22 WM.  & MARY L.
REv. 801,  813 (1981)  ("There is no reason to assume that state court judges cannot and will not provide
a 'hospitable  forum' in litigating federal constitutional questions.").
131.  Cf. Planned  Parenthood  v.  Casey,  505  U.S.  833,  995-1002  (1992)  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting)
(analogizing  Casey  to  Dred  Scott,  lambasting  the  notion  that  the  Court  can  settle  great  national
controversies  through  constitutional  adjudication,  and lauding  the idea  of local  rather  than national
solutions).
132.  See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
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"right"  results, by which I mean  simply that its decisions  prove consonant
with long-term popular opinion. Of course, measuring the Court's relative
institutional  stature  at any particular point in time  is difficult.  Identifying
with any degree of precision the factors that contribute to  or detract  from
that stature is virtually impossible. Necessarily,  then, much of what follows
is impressionistic.
A quick canvass  of American constitutional  history identifies  several
factors that may influence the way in which particular Supreme Court deci-
sions  influence  the  public's  estimation  of the  Court.  First,  I  shall  try to
identify the relevant variables. Then, I will illustrate their application  with
concrete  examples  from  American  constitutional  history.  Finally,  I  shall
consider how these variables apply in the context of Bush v. Gore. My goal
is to shed light on how that ruling is likely to impact the Court's long-term
standing.
My basic premise, to repeat, is that the Court's  institutional standing
ultimately  depends  on  producing  decisions  that  garner the long-term  ap-
proval  of the  American  public.  The  principal  variable  influencing  the
Court's reputation is how popular or unpopular its decisions are. Second, in
addition to the amount of support and opposition  to  particular  decisions,
the  intensity  of that  sentiment-how  strongly  supporters  and  opponents
feel  about  the  underlying  issue-influences  the Court's  standing.  Third,
and relatedly,  intensity of opposition is a function not only of how strongly
people  feel about  an issue, but also how convinced they are that the Court
decision resolving  that issue  will be implemented,  rather than  evaded  or
even nullified. Court rulings that are adverse to  a constituency's  treasured
interests, but that are unlikely to prove efficacious, probably will not gen-
erate tremendous  resistance. Fourth, the relative  power of the  constituen-
cies that  support  and  oppose  the  Court's  rulings  may be  relevant  to  its
long-term  legitimacy.  Decisions  that alienate  relatively  powerful  interest
groups are more  likely to affect adversely the Court's  stature. Fifth, some
constitutional  issues  linger, while  others  fade  away.  Controversial  deci-
sions on topics  that quickly  become obsolete  are unlikely to  do  the  Court
much long-term  harm. Sixth, public opinion changes,  often  quite  dramati-
cally, on some constitutional issues but not others. Court decisions that ini-
tially prove  controversial  may be regarded  later  as great moral  victories.
Conversely,  some  rulings  that  initially  were  approved  subsequently  are
deemed moral disasters.  Seventh,  Justices  sometimes,  but not always,  en-
joy subsequent opportunities  to adjust their  original decision, thus  modu-
lating  results  that  initially  proved  controversial.  Eighth,  contentious
constitutional  decisions  sometimes come  in packages.  A ruling that might
not have significantly impaired the Court's standing had it been an isolated
event, may weaken an institution already under siege because of contempo-
raneous decisions.
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It may be helpful to flesh out these variables  with some concrete  il-
lustrations  from  American  constitutional  history.  It stands  to reason  that
unpopular  decisions  will  threaten  the  Court's  long-term  standing,  espe-
cially given the tenuous  legitimacy of ostensibly  countermajoritarian judi-
cial  review  in a  democratic  system. 3  Historically,  the Justices,  perhaps
comprehending this risk, generally have used the Constitution to suppress
outlier state practices.  Such decisions  are,  almost  by definition,  likely to
generate support among  national majorities.  One may be surprised to  dis-
cover how many of the Court's notable  constitutional rulings  fit this sup-
pression-of-outliers  description.  By no  means  an exhaustive  list includes
Troxel  v.  Granville' 34  (parental  rights);  Romer v.  Evans' 35  (gay  rights);
United States  v.  Virginia 36  (sex  discrimination  in  public  universities);
Plyler  v. Doe' 37 (right of children of illegal aliens to free public education);
Moore  v.  City  of East  Cleveland' 38  (familial  relationships);  Coker  v.
Georgia' 39  (proportionality review in connection  with the  death penalty);
Harper  v.  Virginia  Board  of  Elections4'  (poll  tax);  Griswold  v.
Connecticut. 4'  (right  to  use  contraceptives);  Brown  v.  Mississippi
142
(coerced confessions);  and Nixon v. Herndon' 43  (White primary).'"  On all
these  occasions,  judicial  invalidation  of state  legislation  was  relatively
uncontroversial  because national majorities  agreed with the results of the
Court's constitutional interpretations.  Small wonder that an institution that
is able generally to mirror national opinion, while simultaneously perpetu-
ating the noble  myth that  it heroically  defends  minority  rights from ma-
joritarian oppression, remains so popular with the American public. 4 5
Of course, some of the Court's most famous constitutional rulings  do
not fit this paradigm. On these other, more exceptional  occasions, roughly
half the country agrees with the Court's decision, while the other half dis-
agrees.  I  believe  this  is  a  generally  accurate  description  of Prigg v.
133.  See, e.g., ALE  xmER BICKEL, THE LEsT DANGEROUS BRANCH  16-23  (1962).
134.  530 U.S. 57 (2000).
135.  517 U.S. 620 (1996).
136.  518 U.S. 515 (1996).
137.  457 U.S.  202 (1982).
138.  431 U.S. 494 (1977).
139.  433 U.S. 584 (1977).
140.  383 U.S. 663 (1966).
141.  381 U.S. 479 (1965).
142.  297 U.S.  278 (1936).
143.  273 U.S.  536 (1927).
144.  I provide  support  for  the claim  that these  decisions  involved  suppression  of outlier  state
practices in Michael  J. Kiarman,  Rethinking the History of American Freedom, 42  WM.  & MARY  L.
REv. 265, 279 nn.60-65 (2000) (book review).
145.  Statements  subscribing to this myth are collected in Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82  VA. L. REv.  1, 1-3  & nn.l-14  (1996).  For speculation  on
why the myth continues to hold sway, see id.  at 18-31.
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Pennsylvania' 46 (fugitive slave renditions); Dred  Scott v. Sandford47  (slav-
ery in the territories); Brown v. Board of Education' 48  (school  desegrega-
tion); Furman v. Georgia' 49  (death penalty); Roe v.  Wade5' (abortion); and
Regents of the  University of California v.  Bakke5'  (affirmative  action).
While such decisions  are certain to prove more controversial  than the sup-
pression-of-outliers variety, at least the Justices can count on the support of
roughly 50% of the nation.
On only  a relative handful  of occasions has  the Court interpreted the
Constitution in ways opposed by a clear majority of the nation. This rather
small category includes decisions invalidating school prayer 1 52 and criminal
bans on flag burning,'53  as well as safeguarding  the rights  of criminal  de-
fendants,  such as Miranda v. Arizona.' 54  Even  on these exceptional  occa-
sions, though, it would be a mistake to suppose that overwhelming  popular
majorities opposed  the Court. The Justices  invalidated  school prayer  and
Bible  reading  only  after  the  relative  demise  of the  nation's  unofficial
Protestant establishment.'55  Likewise,  the Warren  Court's  criminal  proce-
dure revolution was rendered possible  only by shifting public  attitudes to-
ward  race,  poverty,  and  totalitarian  law  enforcement  practices.'56  Thus,
while  national  majorities  have  opposed  the Court  decisions  in this  cate-
gory,  a  solid  30%  to  40%  of the  American  public  has  sided  with  the
Justices.
1 57
The number of times that an overwhelming majority of Americans has
opposed the Court's constitutional  interpretations  probably can be counted
on  one  hand.  Chisholm v.  Georgia,' 58  holding  that nonconsenting  states
may be sued in federal court under Article III, clearly is such an instance.
Morehead v. New  York  ex rel. Tipaldo,' 59  invalidating New  York's  mini-
mum wage law in the midst of the Great Depression, may well be another.
146.  41  U.S. (16  Pet.) 539 (1842).
147.  60 U.S. (19  How.) 393 (1857).
148.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).
149.  408  U.S. 238 (1972).
150.  410 U.S.  113 (1973).
151.  438  U.S. 265 (1978).
152.  See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
153.  See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson,  491 U.S. 397 (1989).
154.  384 U.S. 436 (1966).
155.  See Klarman, supra note  145, at 46-62.
156.  Id. at 62-66.
157.  For the polls on  flag burning and school  prayer, see Barry Friedman, Dialogue  and Judicial
Review, 91  MICH.  L. REv. 577, 606  n.142, 607 n.148  (1993).  On Miranda,  see Public Opinion Online,
accession  # 0101597  (on  file with author) (reporting a  December  1966  opinion poll which  found that
56%  of those interviewed  thought that Miranda  imposed restrictions on  police interrogation  that were
too tough, while  only 32%  agreed with the restrictions);  id., accession  # 025403  (on file with author)
(reporting a November  1966  Harris poll finding that 35%  of Americans agreed with Miranda  and  65%
disagreed).
158.  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
159.  298  U.S. 587 (1936).
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Significantly,  both  of these  decisions  did harm  the  Court's  standing.
Chisholm was the Supreme Court's first significant constitutional decision,
and the Justices  got it so wrong (in the sense of contravening  public opin-
ion) that Congress  immediately slapped  them down, passing the Eleventh
Amendment by majorities of nine-to-one in the House and eleven-to-one  in
the Senate. 6  Chief Justice Jay concluded,  as a result of this episode,  that
the  Supreme  Court  never  would  achieve  equal  standing  with  the  other
branches of the national  government;  he  resigned  soon afterwards  to be-
come governor of New York. 61 Similarly, Tipaldo was the straw that broke
the  camel's  back  during  the  New  Deal  constitutional  crisis.1 62  While
President  Roosevelt  and  other  Democrats  had  criticized  earlier  rulings
striking down New Deal measures such as the National Industrial Recovery
Act163  and  the Agricultural  Adjustment  Act,'64 those  statutes  were  suffi-
ciently  controversial  that  the  Court  decisions  invalidating  them  com-
manded  something  close  to  majority  support  in the  nation.1 6 5  By  1936,
however, both Democrats and Republicans  endorsed state minimum wage
legislation, and thus Tipaldo incited a firestorm of criticism. 166 That ruling
was the proximate cause of Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, a scheme that
certainly  would  have  damaged  the  Court's  stature  had  it  been  enacted.
Thus, constitutional rulings that contravene  overwhelming  public opinion,
at least on salient issues, do jeopardize the Court's standing. No doubt cog-
nizant of this reality, the Justices rarely have tempted fate by frustrating the
wishes of dominant majorities.
Whether other rulings harmed the Court's reputation  is partly a prod-
uct of the intensity of preference  manifested by  opponents  of the Court's
decisions.  Thus,  for  example,  Brown v.  Board of Education generated
furious  resistance  among  southern  Whites,  opposition  that  succeeded  at
160.  WILLIAM  R. CAsTo,  THE SuPREmiE  CouRT IN  TmE EARLY REPUBLjC  200 (1995);  1 CHARLES
WARREN,  THE  Supui  m  COURT  IN UNrTED  STATES HISTORY  101  (1926).  On hostile public reaction to
Chisholm, see id.  at 96-101.
161.  See Jay to Adams, Jan. 2,  1801,  in 4 THE  CORRESPONDFNCE AND  PUBLIC PAPERS  OF JOHN
JAY 284, 285  (Henry P. Johnston ed.,  1893)  (noting that Jay had "left the bench perfectly  convinced"
that a judicial  system "so  defective"  could never "obtain  the energy,  weight, and  dignity which  are
essential to its affording due support to the national government, nor acquire the public confidence  and
respect which, as the last resort of the justice of the nation, it should possess").
162.  See William Leuchtenburg,  The Origins of  FDR's Court-Packing  Plan, 1966 Sup. CT. REv.
347,376-77.
163.  A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495  (1935).
164.  Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
165.  BARRY  CusHMAN, RETHnIING THE  NEv DEAL  COURT 34-35 (1998);  Leuchtenburg, supra
note  162, at 368.
166.  See,  e.g.,  WILLIAMi  E.  LEUCHTENBURG,  TE  SuPtREhE  COURT  REBORN  105-06  (1995)
(calling  Tipaldo  "the  last  straw"  and  noting  that  even  the  Republican  Party  had  committed  to
overturning that decision by constitutional amendment).
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blocking implementation  of the Court's edict  for an entire  decade.'67  The
Court's standing among southern Whites was severely impaired as a result
of Brown and other Warren Court rulings.1 8 (The Court's  standing recov-
ered as national,  including  southern, opinion  changed dramatically  on the
race  issue  as a  result of the  1960s'  civil  rights  movement.69)  Similarly,
Dred Scott  v.  Sandford, which  undercut  the  very  legitimacy  of  the
Republican  Party,  predictably  produced  ferocious  opposition  among  the
party faithful. 7  During the Civil War  and Reconstruction,  as many more
Americans rallied to the Republican banner and concluded  that Dred  Scott
had been an egregious mistake, the Court's standing probably did suffer, at
least for a short period of time.'
1 7
Conversely, while a majority of Americans opposed the Court's flag-
burning  decisions  of  1989_90,172  that opposition  does not  appear  to have
been intensely committed, judging by the relative  rapidity with which the
167.  See Bartley,  supra note  82;  NEIL  R.  MCMILLEN,  THE  CmIzENS'  COUNCIL:  ORGANIZED
RESISTANCE  TO  THE  SECOND  RECONSTRUCTION,  1954-64  (1971);  BENJAMIN  MUSE,  TEN  YEARS  OF
PRELUDE:  THE STORY  OF INTEGRATION  SINCE THE SUPREME  COURT'S 1954 DECISION  (1964).
168.  See, e.g., C.  HERMAN  PRITCHETT,  CONGRESS VERSUS  THE SUPREME  COURT  1957-1960, at 18
(1961)  (noting attacks on the Court by southerners that "were vituperative  in the extreme, calling  into
question  not  only the ability  but  also  the  motives  and  the patriotism  of the justices");  WALTER  F.
MURPHY,  CONGRESS  AND  THE COURT:  A CASE  STUDY  IN THE AMERICAN  POLITICAL  PROCESS  264-65
(1962)  (noting  polls  revealing  a  rise  in  the  Supreme  Court's  unfavorable  ratings  among  White
southerners after Brown). BRADY, supra note 7, conveys a vivid sense of how Whites in the deep South
felt about the Supreme Court as a result of Brown.
169.  See,  e.g.,  Poll Finds Gains  for Integration, N.Y.  TIMES,  May  3,  1970, at  53  (reporting  a
Gallup  Poll released in May  1970 which revealed  that only 16%  of southern Whites  opposed sending
their children  to school  with any  Blacks,  as  compared  with  61%  in  1963);  Public  Opinion Online,
accession # 0065113 (on file with author) (reporting a September  1970  Harris poll showing that 55%  of
Americans  agreed  with recent Supreme  Court decisions calling  for immediate desegregation  and 32%
disagreed).
170.  See, e.g., DON E.  FEHRENBACHER,  THE DRED SCOTT  CASE:  ITS  SIGNIFICANCE  IN AMERICAN
LAW  AND  HISTORY  423-27  (1978);  2  CHARLES WARREN,  THE  SUPREME  COURT  IN UNITED  STATES
HISTORY  302-09  (1926);  THE  DRED  ScoTr  DECISION:  LAW  OR  POLITICS?  46-50,  56-63  (Stanley  I.
Kutler ed.,  1967) (reproducing  Republican editorial and political criticism).
171.  See, e.g.,  WALKER  LEWIS,  WITHOUT  FEAR  OR  FAVOR  423  (1965)  (noting  that Dred Scott
"impaired  the prestige of the Court for  years to  come");  id. at 470-71  (noting  ferocious  Republican
attacks  on  Chief Justice  Taney after  his  death  in  1864);  CHARLES  EVANS  HUGHES,  THE  SUPREME
COURT OF THE  UNITED  STATES,  ITS FOUNDATION,  METHODS  AND  ACHIEVEMENTS  51  (1928)  ("It  was
many  years  before  the Court,  even under new judges,  was  able  to  retrieve  its  reputation.");  Edwin
Corwin,  The Dred Scott Decision, in Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrines, 17  AM.  HIST.  REv.  52,
68-69 (1911)  (concluding that the process of "recuperating  its shattered  reputation"  was "so  slow and
laborious"  that the Court did not "play anything like  its due role of supervision"  during  the Civil  War
and Reconstruction). But see FEHRENBACHER,  supra note  170,  at 579 ("[T]he notion that the Supreme
Court, owing to its association with the Dred Scott decision, was in mortal danger during the Civil War,
is  largely  fiction.");  STANLEY  I.  KUTLER,  JUDICIAL  POWER  AND  RECONSTRUCTION  POLITICS  7-11
(1968)  (distinguishing between criticism of Dred Scott and criticism of the Court as an institution,  and
denying that Dred Scott significantly  impaired the Court's national standing).
172.  See Friedman, supra  note  157, at 606 n. 142.
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flag-burning issue has died away.
173  Similarly, one reason that the Court's
school prayer decisions have not significantly impaired its stature, notwith-
standing opposition from sixty to seventy percent of the American public,
may  be  that  critics  are  not intensely  committed  to the  sort  of watered-
down, nondenominational prayer that was  at issue in Engel v.  Vitale and
that likely would be reinstated were that decision ever to be overturned. 1 74
Intensity  of opposition  is  partly  a  product  of how  efficacious  the
Court's rulings  are deemed likely to be. When the Supreme  Court invali-
dated residential  segregation ordinances  in Buchanan v.  Warley'75 in 1917,
the White  South received the news  calmly,  secure in the knowledge  that
residential  segregation  could  be  maintained  without  formal  legal  sanc-
tion.'  Similarly,  when  the  Court  in  Norris  v.  Alabama..  in  1935
overturned the second round of convictions of the Scottsboro Boys  on the
ground that Blacks  had been systematically  excluded from the juries that
indicted and convicted them, southern White reaction was muted,  not be-
cause opposition to Black jury service had significantly eroded, but rather
because  of  confidence  that  the  ruling  easily  could  be  circumvented.'78
Likewise,  one  reason that the Warren Court's criminal  procedure  revolu-
tion has not significantly  impaired the Court's standing may be that legis-
latures have successfully blunted its impact by refusing to adequately fund
counsel for indigent defendants, thus disabling defendants from taking full
advantage of the panoply of constitutional rights identified by the Court.
17 9
Conversely,  one  reason  Brown  aroused  a  firestorm  of resistance
among  White  southerners  is  that,  by  1954,  they  doubted their ability  to
control the decision's impact, given the increased assertiveness  of southern
Blacks inspired by World War II, the diminished availability of violence as
a method of ensuring racial subordination, and the heightened attentiveness
of the  federal  executive  to  civil  rights  issues. 8'  Similarly,  opposition  to
Roe  v.  Wade  has  been  intense  partly  because  the  decision  has  proven
173.  See  ROBERT Jusm  GOLDSTEIN,  FLAG  BURNING  AND  FREE SPEECH 226 (2000) (noting that
after the Supreme  Court's  flag-buming  decisions  of 1989  and  1990,  the  issue disappeared  "with  a
stunning quickness and completeness").
174.  For the actual prayer at issue in that case, see Engel, 370 U.S.  at 422.
175.  245 U.S.  60 (1917).
176.  Richmond  News  Leader, Nov.  6,  1917,  at  4-5;  Wesley  G.  Marshall,  The  Dawn  is
Breaking:  Buchanan v.  Warley and the Fight Against Residential  Segregation  99 (1985)  (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University of Virginia) (on file with author).
177.  294 U.S.  587 (1935).
178.  See sources cited in Michael J. Klarman,  The Racial  Origins of  Modern Criminal  Procedure,
90 MICH. L. REv. 48, 80 nn.155-56 (2000).
179.  See William  Stuntz,  The  Uneasy Relationship Between  Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE LJ. 1 (1997).
180.  See generally  MICHAEL J. K-ARmAN,  NEITHER HERO, NOR VILLAIN:  THE  SUPREME COURT,
RACE,  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION  IN THE TWENTIETH  CENTURY ch.  4 (analyzing  the Supreme  Court's
approach to race issues during the World War H era) (forthcoming 2003).
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difficult to nullify, given the market incentives it created for abortion sup-
pliers. 181
Another  factor influencing whether  controversial constitutional  deci-
sions adversely affect the Court's standing is the relative power wielded by
supporters  and  critics. Not  all constituencies  affected  by  Court decisions
exercise  the  same  clout.  For example,  Court  rulings  from the  late  nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries invalidating the progressive income tax
and  striking  down  minimum  wage, maximum hour,  and protective  union
legislation  were  intensely  controversial. 8 2 Yet  opponents  of these  deci-
sions, on average, lacked the economic and political resources  of support-
ers. Similarly, more recent controversial decisions such as Roe v.  Wade and
Engel v.  Vitale generally have won the endorsement of the nation's cultural
elite,  which tends to be both better educated  and more  socioeconomically
advantaged  than  the  average  American.'83  While  nearly  half the  country
has  criticized  the  abortion  decision  and more  than  half has  opposed  the
school prayer ruling, the Court's  defenders  exercise relatively greater eco-
nomic, political,  and cultural  clout, thus reducing the likelihood that these
rulings  will  diminish  the Court's  stature.  Even  more  dramatically,  oppo-
nents of Plessy v. Ferguson," 84 the Court's first decision rejecting an equal-
ity-based challenge to racial segregation,  exercised almost no power at all.
Whites  overwhelmingly  endorsed Plessy, and  African  Americans  at the
turn  of the  last century  were  politically  disfranchised  and  economically
marginal. 1 85  Conversely,  an  important  component  of  the  opposition  to
Reynolds v. Sims,'86 the reapportionment decision, consisted of politicians,
who wield enormous  political  power (overrepresented  rural  dwellers  also
opposed Reynolds, though such groups were, in most cases, a minority of a
minority of the population). These politically influential  critics of Reynolds
nearly were able to secure  a constitutional  amendment overturning the de-
cision. 1 8 7 Yet,  once  that effort had  failed,  Reynolds quickly  generated  its
own  powerful  constituency  of supporters:  politicians  elected  under  the
181.  See  GERALD  N.  ROSENBERG,  THE  HOLLOW  HOPE:  CAN  COURTS  BRING  AMour  SOcIAL
CHANGE?  195-201  (1991).
182.  The leading cases included Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)  (minimum wage
law);  Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)  (pro-union legislation); Lochner v. New York, 198  U.S. 45
(1905)  (maximum hour law);  Pollock v. Farmers  Loan & Trust Co.,  158 U.S. 601  (1895)  (income  tax).
For  the  controversy  generated  by  such  decisions,  see  generally  WILLIAM  Ross,  A  MUTED
FURY:  POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES,  AND  LABOR UNIONS  CONFRONT THE  COURTS,  1890-1937 (1994).
183.  On  this  culturally elite  bias  of judicial  review,  see Michael  J.  Klarman,  What's So  Great
About Constitutionalism?,  93 Nw. U. L. REV.  145,  188-92 (1998).
184.  163  U.S. 537 (1896).
185.  See Michael J. Klarman,  The Plessy Era, 1998 Sup. CT. REV.  303.
186.  377  U.S.  533 (1964).
187.  See DAVID KYVIG,  EXPLICIT AND  AuTHENTic  ACTs 374-76 (1996).
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one-person-one-vote  regime of Reynolds had a vested interest in defending
that decision."' 8
Some  constitutional  issues fade  away  and others linger. The Court's
prestige  is not jeopardized  by controversial  or even unpopular rulings  on
issues that quickly lose their salience.  For example, the public controversy
over Dred  Scott, which was intense  in the late  1850s,189  dissipated rapidly
once the Civil  War and postwar constitutional  amendments  had abolished
slavery and guaranteed  Black citizenship, thus rendering Dred  Scott obso-
lete.  The  Court's  rulings  invalidating  New  Deal legislation  in  1935  and
1936190 suffered a similar fate. The immediate  effect of these decisions was
to produce  a confrontation  with the president  that threatened the  Court's
standing;  Roosevelt's  Court-packing plan had the potential  to destroy the
Court as we know it. 9' Yet once the Justices shifted constitutional gears,19 2
economic  legislation  quickly  became  immune  from constitutional  chal-
lenge. 93 The issue that had provoked the  Court-packing  episode  was ob-
solete within just a couple of years.194 Likewise, the decision in Korematsu
v.  United  States, 19 5  sustaining  the  wartime  internment  of  Japanese
Americans, already was generating  considerable criticism by the end of the
war,1 96  and soon would come  to be regarded  as a quintessential  failure  of
judicial nerve.19 7 Yet, since the underlying issue simply was not relevant to
peacetime  America, the  decision  did little  lasting  damage  to the  Court's
reputation.  Other issues that generate  Court  decisions  refuse  to  go away.
188.  See JOHN  HART  ELY,  DaiiocRAcy  AND  DisTRusT  121  (1980)  ("[Ihe incentive of elected
representatives  is  not  necessarily toward  malapportionment  but  rather  toward  maintaining  whatever
apportionment,  good or bad, it is that got and keeps them where they are.").
189.  See supra  note  170.
190.  See supra  notes  163-164.
191.  CuSHmAN, supra note  165, at 13-14  (reporting statements by opponents  of the plan); JOSEPH
ALSOP & TURNER  CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS  107,  114-15 (1938)  (same).
192.  Constitutional  historians  continue  to  debate  precisely when  and why that  shift  occurred.
Compare CUsHmAN,  supra note  165  (denying  that  any fundamental  shift  occurred  in  1937),  with
BRUCE  AcKNitAN,  WE  =hE  PEOPLE:  TRANSFORmAiONS  366-68  (1998)  (arguing  there  was  a
revolution  in  1937),  and LEUCHTENBURG,  supra note  166,  at  ch.  8  (same).  See  also  Richard  D.
Friedman,  Snitching Time and Other Thought Experiments:  The Hughes Court and Constitutional
Transformation, 142  U.  PA.  L. REv.  1891,  1982  (1994)  (denying  any "revolution"  but  conceding
greater significance to Jones  & Laughlin Steel than does Cushman).
193.  See, e.g., Williamson  v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483  (1955);  Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S.  106 (1949).
194.  See generally Walton  H. Hamilton  & George  D. Braden,  The Special Competence of the
Supreme Court, 50 YALE L.J.  1319,  1340-41  & n.82 (1941)  (collecting cases).
195.  323 U.S. 214 (1944).
196.  See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow,  The Japanese  American Cases-A Disaster,  54 YALE L.J. 489
(1945);  Nanette  Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment:  The Supreme Court's
Korematsu  and Endo Decisions,  45  CoLUm1.  L. REv. 175 (1945).
197.  See,  e.g.,  JurrH  A.  BAER,  EQUALITY  UNDER  THE  CONsT=rrlON:  RECLAIMING  THE
FOURTEENTH  AMENDmNT  113,  149  (1983)  (calling  Korematsu "racist" and a "disgrace");  MICHAEL
PERRY,  THE  CoNs=rrrtrroN  IN THE  CouRm:  LAW  OR  POLITICS?  145  (1994)  (calling  the  decision
"almost universally discredited");  Laurence H. Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law
be Color-Blind?,  20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 201,202 (1986)  (calling Korematsu  "infamous").
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Abortion and  school prayer have remained at the center of public contro-
versy for well over a quarter of a century since the Court first put them on
its  constitutional agenda. 19 8 Whether or not Roe and Engel have damaged
the Court's standing, it seems clear that controversial rulings on issues that
have staying power pose a relatively  greater threat to the Court's  reputa-
tion.
Just  as  the diminishing  salience  of an  issue may  affect  the Court's
ability to weather a storm of public  controversy, significant shifts in public
opinion on issues that retain their salience may impact the Court's standing
as well. Brown v. Board of Education was intensely controversial  in  1954,
but was much less so by  1964,  and by 1974 enjoyed the  strong support  of
Americans,  Black and  White,  North  and  South.'99  Roe  v.  Wade, on  the
other hand, is nearly as controversial today as it was in 1973.00  Thus, the
Court's  reputation may  depend,  to  a  significant  degree,  on  the  Justices'
skill at predicting the future. Brown is the greatest judicial prognostication
of all time. The Justices rightly understood that a fundamental shift in race
relations was in the offing.20'  By acting as part of the vanguard of the civil
rights movement, the Justices garnered substantial-indeed,  somewhat ex-
aggerated-credit for the transformation in race relations that ensued.0"
Yet, public opinion does not always shift with the Court;  it can move
in the opposite  direction  as  well.  Thus, a  Court  decision  that  is  initially
popular or that generates a mixed response can later become so universally
criticized  as to  subject the  Court to  popular  vilification.  Dred Scott and
Plessy surely  illustrate  this phenomenon,  and Korematsu may  as well.2 0 3
198.  See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (invalidating restrictions on "partial birth"
abortion);  Santa Fe  Independent School  Dist. v. Doe, 530  U.S. 290 (2000) (invalidating prayer at high
school football games).
199.  See supra note 169; see also MUSE, supra note  167, at 211 (noting a dramatic increase by the
early 1960s in the percentage of southerners who believed school desegregation  was inevitable); id. at
270-71  (noting a dramatic shift in national opinion on race by 1963).
200.  Compare Public  Opinion  Online,  accession  #  0380244  (on  file  with  author)  (reporting a
Roper opinion poll from April 2001  revealing that 47%  of Americans  consider themselves pro-choice,
as opposed to 41%  who consider themselves pro-life) with id., accession # 0045804 (reporting a March
1974 Gallup opinion poll showing that 47% of Americans supported Roe v.  Wade and 44% opposed it).
201.  For the Justices'  perception that racial change was in the  offing, see the statements quoted  in
Michael J.  Klarman, Civil Rights Law:  Who Made It and How Much Did It Matter?, 83  GEO.  L.J. 433,
458 (1994)  (book  review).  For the extralegal  causes of this  change,  see Michael  J. Klarman,  Brown,
Racial  Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REv. 7,  13-75 (1994).
202.  For  the debate  over  how  much credit  the Court  deserves,  compare  Gerald  N.  Rosenberg,
Brown Is Dead! Long Live Brown!:  The Endless Attempt  to Canonize a Case, 80 VA.  L.  REV.  161
(1994)  (almost no credit) with David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing  of
Brown v. Board of Education,  80 VA. L. Rev.  151  (1994)  (tremendous credit), and Michael J. Klarman,
Brown v. Board of Education:  Facts and Political  Correctness, 80 VA.  L.  REv.  185 (1994)  (indirect
and moderate credit).
203.  Dred Scott probably enjoyed majority support in the nation when  decided. FEHRENBACHER,
supra note 170, at 565-66 (noting that Dred Scott seemed,  if anything, to help northern  Democrats  in
the 1857  state elections). Plessy was so consonant with public opinion that it went virtually unnoticed.
See,  e.g.,  CHARLES  A.  LOFGREN,  THE  Plessy  CASE:  A  LEGAL-HsTORICAL  INTERPRETATION  197
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Fortunately for the Court, dramatic shifts in public  opinion that render the
Court a  target  of public  vituperation  frequently  occur  on  issues  that the
passage  of time  has  rendered  largely  obsolete.  On such  occasions,  even
nearly universal public condemnation  of its rulings seems to take little toll
on  the  Court's  standing.  Within  a  decade  or two  of the  decisions,  few
Americans  were  prepared  to  defend Dred Scott  or,  to  a  lesser  extent,
Korematsu. 2"  Yet,  since  the  issues  adjudicated  in  these  cases  had been
rendered  largely  obsolete, the rulings  became  curiosities  rather than  irri-
tants. If this observation is correct, there may be a one-way ratchet of sorts
at work  with regard  to  controversial  Court  decisions  on  issues  where  a
dramatic  shift  in  public  opinion  subsequently  occurs.  Apparently,  the
Justices receive enormous credit for correctly predicting the future, but not
much blame for incorrectly predicting it, at least when the underlying issue
quickly loses its salience. Concretely, the Court's heroic decision in Brown
seems, in the public  mind, vastly to outweigh  ignoble judicial  deeds  such
as Dred  Scott, Plessy, Korematsu, and the like."5
On other issues, public  opinion changes, while the salience of the is-
sue remains high. In this category of cases, significantly, the Justices  gen-
erally enjoy second chances to get their decisions right-that is, they have
opportunities to reconsider their initial ruling and, if necessary, to revise or
retract it, in light of hostile public opinion. Furman v. Georgia  may be the
best exemplar of this phenomenon.  In  1972,  Supreme  Court Justices read
the tea leaves of public opinion as indicating that capital punishment in the
United  States  was on the road to extinction.2 6 Opinion polls  in the mid-
1960s revealed,  for the first and thus  far  only time  in American  history,
(1987);  Benno  C.  Schmidt,  Jr.,  Principle  and Prejudice:  The  Supreme  Court  and  Race  in  the
Progressive Era, 82  CoLuri. L. REv.  444, 469 (1982).  Korematsu  was exactly what most Americans
demanded during the war. PE=F  IRONS, JuSTIcE AT  WAR  ch. 3  (1983).  For subsequent vilification of
these decisions, see the statements quoted in Klarman,  Civil Rights, supra note  145, at 25, 28.
204.  On  Korematsu,  see, for  example,  THE  AUrOBIOGRAPHY  OF WILLIAM 0.  DOUGLAS:  Ti
COURT YEARS,  1939-1975,  at 280 (1980)  (recanting his vote in Korematsu);  IRONS, supra note 203,  at
362 (noting a  1983  report to Congress  by the Commission  on Wartime  Relocation,  which concluded
that the internment of Japanese Americans was a "grave injustice" resulting from "race prejudice").  On
Dred  Scott,  see  FEHRENBACHER,  supra  note  170,  at  573  ("as  time  passed,  [Dred  Scott]  was  an
embarrassment-the  Court's highly visible skeleton in a transparent closet"); Downes v. Bidwell,  182
U.S.  244, 273-74  (1901)  (noting that the Civil War had "produced such  changes in judicial, as well as
public sentiment, as to seriously impair the authority of [Dred Scott]").
205.  Apparently, the myth of the Court as countermajoritarian hero is just too attractive to resist.
See Klarman,  Civil Rights, supra note  145, at 19-23.
206.  DELAVAN  DICKSON,  TBE SuPREam  COURT  IN  CONFERENCE:  1940-1985,  at  617  (2001)
(conference  notes  from Furman v.  Georgia:  Justice Brennan  noting that support for abolition  of the
death penalty has increased during the twentieth century;  Justice Stewart predicting that "[s]omeday the
Court will hold that the death sentence is unconstitutionar');  see also Furman v. Georgia, 408  U.S. 238,
313  (1972)  (White, J.,  concurring)  (observing that the death penalty "has for all practical  purposes run
its course"); Jeffries, supra note 10, at 413-14.
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national  pluralities  opposed  to  capital  punishment.2°7  A  majority  of the
Justices  decided to  give  the  death penalty  a  nudge toward  constitutional
oblivion.0 ' Yet, public opinion on the death penalty shifted dramatically in
the mid-1970s, perhaps  partly in reaction  to  the Court's  ruling. 2 0 9  Within
four  years  of Furman, thirty-five  state  legislatures  had  manifested  their
desire to retain the death penalty, by revising their statutes to take account
of the objections  raised in Furman. 21  The Justices,  plainly influenced  by
this resounding popular endorsement of the death penalty, "' switched gears
in  1976, sustaining the constitutionality of the death penalty, provided it is
administered  in  a suitably  constrained  manner. 2 2  We  know  from  subse-
quent experience  in California  that  determined judicial  resistance  to im-
plementation  of the  death  penalty  in the  face  of overwhelming  popular
approval can  injure a court's stature.213 The United States  Supreme Court
avoided  incurring the  public's wrath  because  it  took advantage  of post-
Furman opportunities to align its death penalty jurisprudence with national
opinion.
The  so-called  "switch  in time"  of 1937  likewise  illustrates  how  the
iterative  quality  of constitutional interpretation  affords the Court opportu-
nities to conserve its institutional prestige by adjusting,  or even retracting,
initially controversial  decisions.  President Roosevelt threatened  to destroy
the  Court in  response  to  its  1936  decisions  invalidating  the Bituminous
Coal  Conservation  Act,  the  Agricultural  Adjustment  Act,  and  the  New
York minimum wage law.2 14 The very next year, the Justices  took advan-
tage  of opportunities to reconsider their position, and by doing so,  helped
207.  Jeffries,  supra  note  10,  at  406;  Carole  S.  Steiker  &  Jordan  M.  Steiker,  Sober  Second
Thoughts: Reflections  on  Two  Decades  of Constitutional Regulation  of Capital  Punishment,  109
HARv.  L. REV.  355, 410 n.273 (1995)  (noting that in  1966 a Gallup poll, for the first time ever, revealed
more Americans opposing than favoring the death penalty).
208.  Jeffiies, supra note  10, at 413.
209.  Jeffiies,  supra note  10,  at 414  (reporting Gallup  polls and  concluding  that the  increase  in
public support for the death penalty  after Furman was  "so sharp that it  seems almost certain  to have
been a negative  reaction to the  Court's decision");  Steiker & Steiker, supra note  207, at 411-12  ("[lt
seems fair to say that Furman galvanized political opposition to abolition .... .").
210.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.  153,  179-80 (1976)  (plurality opinion);  Jeffries, supra note  10, at
414; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 207, at 40.
211.  DIcKSON,  supra note 206,  at 620-21  (citing conference  notes  in Gregg  v.  Georgia:  Justice
Stewart  noting  that thirty-five  legislatures have  revised  their death penalty  statutes  since  1972,  thus
indicating  that "evolving  standards  of decency"  continue to support the death penalty; Justice  Powell
emphasizing the recent state statutes).
212.  See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.  153  (1976).
213.  See,  e.g.,  Robert  S.  Thompson,  Judicial Independence,  Judicial Accountability,  Judicial
Elections, and the California Supreme  Court:  Defining the Terms  of the Debate,  59  S.  CAL.  L. REv.
809, 812, 847-50,  858-59  (1986)  (describing successful recall efforts against  California Supreme  Court
Justices who were perceived to have frustrated the voters'  will regarding the death penalty).
214.  Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,  298  U.S.  238  (1936);  United States  v. Butler, 297  U.S.  1 (1936);
Morehead  v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S.  587 (1936).
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ensure  the defeat  of Roosevelt's  Court-packing  plan.2 5  Many commenta-
tors have interpreted Terry v. Ohio,2 16 which sustained police stop-and-frisk
tactics even in the absence of probable  cause,  as a judicial (and judicious)
concession to public opinion, which had been agitated by the Court's  deci-
sion  in Miranda v. Arizona two years  earlier. 2 7 The apparent  shift in the
Court's attitude  toward time-release programs  for religious  observance  in
public schools between  1948 and 1952,18  and toward legislative investiga-
tion of alleged communists between 1957 and  1959,219 likewise may reflect
the Justices'  recognition of the wisdom of making  occasional  concessions
to adverse public opinion.
Finally, the Court's standing and legitimacy  are most at risk when it
renders  unpopular or controversial  decisions in bunches,  rather than  indi-
vidually.  The  Court  came  under  severe  attack  in the  late  1950s-from
Congress,  the American  Bar Association,  the  Conference  of State  Chief
Justices,  and legal  academics-because  it took  on so many controversial
causes simultaneously. 22  Still reeling from the White South's assault upon
Brown,  the  Justices  tempted  fate  by  taking  on  the  professional
anti-Communists  with their famous Red Monday decisions  of 1957,21  the
law  enforcement  lobby  with  some  forerunners  of  the  1960s  criminal
215.  The relevant decisions are West  Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937);  NLRB v.
Jones  & Laughlin  Steel Corp.,  301  U.S.  1 (1937);  and Steward  Machine  Co. v. Davis, 301  U.S. 548
(1937).  For the impact of these decisions on  the Court-packing plan, see CuSHMAN, supra note  165, at
18-23; Atsop &  CATLEDGE, supra note  191,  at 144-47. Cushman, of course, denies that these decisions
represented,  in any strong sense, "reconsideration"  ofthe decisions from the preceding term.
216.  392  U.S.  1 (1978).
217.  See, e.g., Tracy Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy:  Black Men and  Police
Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1271,  1317 (1998)  (attributing Terry to a prevalent public perception
that the Court in decisions such as Miranda  "had gone too far in policing the police").
218.  Compare MeCollum v. Board of Education,  333 U.S. 203  (1948)  (invalidating time-release
program)  with Zorach v. Clauson,  343  U.S. 306  (1952)  (sustaining a  slightly different  time-release
program).  See  also C.  HeAaN  PsrrcT=r,  CIVIL  LIBERTIES  AND  THE  VINSON  COURT  14  (1954)
(attributing the shift to the Court's  "dispos~ition]  to use any available method to quiet the storm caused
by  the  McCollum  decision");  MELVIN  1. URoFsKY,  DrvsIoN  AND  Discoiw:  THE  SuPREME  CouRt
UNDER  STO'm AND  VINsoN,  1941-1953,  at 236 (1997)  (noting that McCollum "stirred up a nationwide
furor among religious  groups"  and that many have attributed  the result in Zorach to the strong public
outcry against the earlier decision).
219.  Compare Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)  (placing constitutional limits on
legislative  investigations), andWatkins v. United States, 354 U.S.  178  (1957)  (same), with Uphaus v.
Wyman,  360 U.S. 72 (1959)  (narrowly construing those limits), and Barenblatt v. United States,  360
U.S.  109  (1959)  (same). Murphy  identifies  a  "tactical  withdrawal"  by the Court in  1959.  Mtuyiu',
supra note 168, at 246. Pritchett concludes that Barenblatt  and Uphaus "suggest that the attacks [on the
Court] did in fact take some toll of the Court's will to resist."  PmrcHE'rr, supra note 168, at 132.
220.  MuRPH-rv, supra note 168, at 266 (arguing  that the Warren Court made the mistake of taking
on "too  many powerful  enemies at one time");  PRIrcHErr,  supra note  168,  at  15-20  (noting that, in
addition to the national security issue, the Court's rulings on school desegregation,  criminal procedure,
and various federalism issues had alienated powerful constituencies).
221.  Watkins  v. United  States,  354 U.S.  178  (1957);  Sweezy  v. New Hamphsire,  354  U.S.  234
(1954);  Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298  (1957). These are discussed in MtURHy,  supra note 168,
at 100-06; Pmrc-mHrr,  supra  note 168, chs. 4-5.
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procedure revolution,22 2 and federalism  aficionados with the beginnings of
the habeas  revolution?2 3  The  Court  simply  offended too  many  powerful
constituencies  at once,  and was  forced to backtrack  in the  late  1950s, re-
jecting the broadest implications of its  Red Monday  decisions  in  1959,24
and generally  absenting  itself from the  school  desegregation  controversy
until after  the civil rights  movement had  caught the  country up with the
Court.25   Likewise,  the  New  Deal  Court  got  itself  into  trouble  by
invalidating numerous federal statutes in just eighteen months.26 Finally,  a
series  of Marshall  Court  decisions  between  1816  and  1824227  made  the
Court so unpopular in  so many states that a genuine  risk of congressional
retaliation arose,  either in the form of a statute curtailing  the Court's  ap-
pellate jurisdiction, or  a constitutional  amendment fundamentally  altering
the judicial review power. 2 2 8 Most scholars believe that the Marshall  Court
engaged in a strategic retreat during its final  decade, in order to blunt these
retaliatory efforts.229
These  seem to me the  most important  factors  influencing  how par-
ticular  decisions  impact  the  Court's  long-term  standing.  Evaluating  the
222.  See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957)  (invalidity of confession made when
defendant  was  not  promptly brought  before a  magistrate,  as  required  by  Federal  Rules of Criminal
Procedure);  Jencks  v.  United  States,  353  U.S.  657  (1957)  (defendants'  right  of access  to  relevant
information contained in prosecutor's files).
223.  Brown v. Allen,  344  U.S.  443  (1953)  (dramatically expanding the scope  of relief available
under federal habeas corpus review).
224.  Uphaus  v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72  (1959);  Barenblatt  v. United  States,  360 U.S.  109  (1959).
These are discussed in MURPHY, supra  note  168, at 229-3 1; PRITCHErr, supra  note 168,  at 48-58.
225.  On  the Court's  absenting itself from the school desegregation  controversy, see,  for example,
J. HARVIE  WILKINSON,  FROM  BROWN  TO  BAKE:  THm  SUPREME  COURT  AND  SCHOOL  INTEGRATION
1954-1978, ch. 5 (1979). The Court did intervene, but only in extreme circumstances.  Cooper v. Aaron,
358  U.S.  1 (1958)  (defiance  of Brown, followed  by school  closures); Bush v. Orleans Parish  Sch. Bd.,
365  U.S.  569  (1961)  (summarily  affirming  invalidation  of state  statute  authorizing  closure  of any
school ordered to integrate). The Court only reentered the fray as the civil rights movement reached  its
pinnacle. See  Goss  v. Bd.  of Educ.,  373  U.S.  683  (1963)  (invalidating  minority-to-majority  student
transfer policy);  Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964)  (invalidating school closures).
226.  See, e.g.,  PAUL  L.  MURPHY,  THE  CONSTrrTUTION  IN CRIsIs  TIMES,  1918-1969,  ch.5  (1972)
(describing the rulings and the crisis they generated).
227.  See, e.g., Osbom  v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738  (1824);  Green v. Biddle,
21  U.S.  (9  Wheat.)  1  (1823);  Cohens  v.  Virginia,  19  U.S.  (9  Wheat.)  264  (1821);  Sturges  v.
Crowninshield,  17  U.S.  (9  Wheat.)  122 (1819);  Martin  v. Hunter's  Lessee,  14 U.S.  (9  Wheat.)  304
(1816).
228.  See, e.g.,  I  WARREN,  supra note  160,  ch.  17;  DwicHT  WILEY  JESSUP,  REACION  AND
AccoMMODATION:  THE UNITED  STATES SUPREME  COURT AND  POLITIcAL  CONFLICT  1809-1835,  ch.  5
(1987).
229.  See,  e.g.,  JEssUP, supra note  228,  chs.  6-7;  R.  KENr  NEwMYER,  THE  SUPREME  CouRT
UNDER  MARSHALL  AND  TANEY  84-88  (1968);  G.  EDWARD  WHITE,  THE  MARSHALL  COURT  AND
CULTURAL  CHANGE  VoLS.  1I1-IV:  HISTORY  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  950
(1988);  Mark A. Graber,  Federalist  or Friends of Adans:  The Marshall  Court and Party  Politics, 12
STUDIES  Am. POL.  DEVEL.  229, 233  (1998).  The leading cases  in support of the retreat hypothesis are
Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 30 U.S. (5  Pet.) 457 (1831);  Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.)
514  (1830); Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27  U.S. (2 Pet.) 245  (1829);  Ogden v. Saunders,
25 U.S. (12  Wheat.) 213 (1827).
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likely significance of Bush v. Gore according to these variables is straight-
forward,  though  necessarily  no  less  impressionistic  than  identifying  the
relevant factors in the first place.
Half the country, the half that voted for Al  Gore, thinks the result in
Bush  v.  Gore was  wrong;  many  think  it was  egregiously  so. 230  Some
Republicans  acknowledge (especially  in private) that the Court's  decision
was bad law, but generally they are not unhappy with the result. 231 Thus, if
I am right that the Court's long-term legitimacy depends  more on whether
people approve its results than on the quality of its legal reasoning, roughly
half the country will approve  and roughly half will condemn Bush. 232 Yet,
while nearly all Democrats criticize Bush, it is not clear how intense their
opposition  is. Surely most Americans  are more  energized by presidential
elections than by flag burning. On the other hand, relatively few Gore  sup-
porters seem to have manifested an intensity of commitment for their can-
didate approaching  that displayed by right-to-lifers  in opposition to Roe v.
Wade. Indeed,  a principal  reason that Gore  found himself in the Florida
predicament that he did (recall that all the political scientists'  models pre-
dicted a relatively comfortable  victory for him)233 was the relative lack  of
enthusiasm evinced by many Democrats for their party's candidate. 234 Thus
one might surmise that many Democrats'  opposition to Bush v. Gore will
be lukewarm at best. My  hunch, however, is that this  supposition is  mis-
taken. The commitment of many Democrats to contesting the Florida elec-
tion results was less a product of their enthusiasm for their candidate than a
reaction  against  what  they  regarded  as  the  egregious  misbehavior  of
Republicans  during  the election  controversy. 2 35  Once  the Supreme  Court
230.  Richard Morin  & Claudia  Deane, Public Backs  Uniform US.  Voting Rules, WASH.  Posr,
Dec.  18,  2000, at Al  (reporting an  opinion  poll revealing  that 50%  of the  public approved  of the
Supreme Court decision and 48% disapproved); Montgomery, supra note 34, at A10.
231.  See sources cited supra  note 23.
232.  See Kaiser, supra note  15,  at A25  (quoting legal historian Lawrence Friedman  to the effect
that "[t]he country  is split 50-50 politically, and they're probably split 50-50  on [Bush v. Gore]"); id.
(quoting legal historian Howard Gillman to the effect that "[w]hat  the court did was  align itself with
half the country against the other half').
233.  Robert  G.  Kaiser, Academics Say It's Elementary, WASH.  Posr,  Aug.  31,  2000,  at  A12
(noting that six of seven political scientists predicted Gore to win between 52.4% and 55A%  of the vote
cast for the two major parties'  candidates,  and the seventh predicted  him to win 60.3%).  I guess  the
political scientists have some remodeling to do before the next election.
234.  See, e.g.,  Terry M. Neal, Some Black Voters View  Gore as the Lesser of Two Evils, WAsH.
Posr, Oct. 29, 2000, at A4 (noting doubts as to "vhether  Gore has generated the enthusiasm he needs
among the Democrats'  most loyal constituency  [African-Americans]").
235.  See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid & Michael Tackett, Democratic  Leaders  Certify Their Support  for
Gore, Cm. Tpm.,  Nov. 28,  2000, at  1 (noting Democratic  anger over the tactics  of Republicans  in
Florida  and quoting one  Democratic  congressman  observing that "[t]he  actions of some of our more
Republican  partisans  over  the  past  few  days  have  stiffened  and  strengthened  the  resolve  of the
Democrats"); Nicholas Confessore, Florida's  Silver Lining: For Gore and the Democrats,  Losing Ugly
Beats Losing Nicely, THE  AMiiR. PROSPEcr ONLiNE,  Dec.  11,  2000, reprinted in BUSH v. GoRE,  supra
note 20, at 269, 270 (noting that the Bush camp's behavior was "so extreme, so over-the-top, that it had
the unintended consequence of shoring up Gore's support among his  own party");  Thomas B.  Edsall,
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defied  the pundits'  predictions  by involving  itself in the  election  contro-
versy, 236 Democratic  resentment  toward  Republican  politicians  and  Bush
campaign  operatives  easily  was  transferred  to  a  conservative  Supreme
Court majority, seemingly  bent on doing the  GOP's bidding.  My guess is
that even lukewarm Gore supporters were outraged by the result in Bush v.
Gore. Moreover, Bush proved to be one of the most efficacious  decisions
in  the  Court's  history.  The  conservative  majority  ruled  that  the  Florida
manual  recount must stop;  Al  Gore  conceded  the election  within twenty-
four hours. 37  This efficacious  a ruling, on this divisive an issue,  is certain
to generate tremendous resentment toward the Court.
As to the relative power of the constituencies impacted by the Court's
decision,  both  Democrats  and  Republicans  have plenty  of political  and
economic  clout  in  American  society.  Thus,  Bush  v.  Gore is  not  a  case
where the Court's critics are relatively disadvantaged in the public relations
battle that follows the ruling. On the other hand, it is hard to think of a con-
stitutional issue that is more destined to become obsolete. George W. Bush
will  be president,  possibly as a result of the Supreme  Court's ruling, for
four  years.  If he  serves  eight years, an  intervening  independent  cause,  a
second electoral  victory, will greatly reduce the Court's  responsibility for
the second term. There  is unlikely to be  another presidential  election  like
Top  Democrats Rally  Behind  Gore,  WASH.  POST, Nov.  28, 2000,  at  A1O (noting  that  "several
Democratic  lawmakers  said  they  are so angry at what  they consider  inflammatory  GOP  rhetoric  that
they are increasingly committed to Gore's cause"); see also Thomas E. Mann,  Gore Owes It to Nation
to Fight On, BosTON  GLOBE, Nov. 28, 2000, at A15, reprinted  in BUSH v. GORE, supra  note 20, at 204,
205  ("In  30  years  of watching  Congress  and the  presidency,  I have  never  encountered  rhetoric  as
vituperative  and destructive  of the constitutional order as has emanated from established figures in the
Republican Party and their partisan allies.").
236.  See supra note 45; David  Von Drehle  et al., Anxious Moments  in the Final  Stretch, WASH.
PosT,  Feb. 3,  2001, at Al  ("The initial Bush appeal had been a suit that all the law professors said the
[Supreme  Court]  would never take ....  ); Maggie  Mulvihill,  Case  Unlikely to  Go to  High Court,
BOSTON  HERALD,  Nov. 18, 2000, at 4 (noting that "[1]egal  experts doubt that the matter will be taken up
by  the  highest  court  in the  land");  Larry  Lipman  &  Kathy  Pruitt, Did Fla. Court Go Too  Far?,
ATLANTA  J. AND  CONST.,  Nov.  25, 2000,  at A7  (noting that "[tihe  Supreme  Court's  decision to hear
Bush's  appeal  came  as a  surprise");  Joan  Biskupic,  Courts Can't Unravel All Election Snags, USA
TODAY,  Nov.  17,  2000,  at IA  (predicting that  "the black-robed  nine in  Washington  will beg  off');
David G.  Savage & Henry  Weinstein, America Waits, L.A. TIMss,  Nov. 23, 2000, at A24 ("Most legal
experts  agreed  that  there  [were]  long  odds  against  Bush's  actually  winning  in  the  Supreme
Court....").  But see Einer Elhauge, Bush v. Florida,  N.Y. Timus, Nov. 20,  2000, at A27 (stating that if
the Florida  Supreme  Court orders a  manual recount, "no  one should be surprised if the U.S.  Supreme
Court steps in").
237.  One can only marvel at the enormous prestige of an institution that could command such total
obedience  to such  a  lawless decision.  Imagine  how  different the reaction  of the Jeffersonians  would
have  been  two hundred  years  earlier  had  counterfactual  litigation  resulted  in  a  Federalist  Supreme
Court awarding victory  to John Adams (or Aaron  Burr) in the disputed presidential  election of 1800.
The  Marshall  Court was too intimidated by the Jefferson administration  even  to order the Secretary  of
State to  deliver commissions  to justices of the peace  appointed  by  outgoing  President  Adams.  See
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)  137  (1803). The idea of that Court attempting to adjudicate the
results of a presidential  election (and having anyone pay attention to its determination,  should it dare to
do so) is simply incomprehensible.
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this  past  one  during  the  lifetime  of anyone  now  living.  Moreover,  the
Supreme Court's  ruling in Bush, by design, will have implications  for no
other constitutional issue;  the Justices in the majority made clear their in-
tention to treat the decision as "good for this day and train only."238 Memo-
ries of what most Democrats will regard as the (at least attempted) judicial
theft  of  a  presidential  election  will  survive,  but  they  will  be  just
that-memories.  Bush's presence  in the White  House for four years  will
constitute a short-term reminder of the Court's decision. But this is not like
the abortion issue, which just will not go away,  and thus serves  as a con-
stant reminder to right-to-lifers  of Supreme  Court  decisions like Roe and
Casey.
On the other hand, unlike with racial  segregation, where public opin-
ion transformed over time, popular attitudes toward Bush v. Gore probably
never will change very much. Democrats  are likely always to believe that
the Supreme Court intervened in the 2000 presidential election because the
conservative  Justices preferred  George W.  Bush for president. 2  Perhaps
some  attitudes will change if Bush proves to be a particularly good or bad
President, 2 4 0  but probably  not too many. Moreover, unlike  with the  death
penalty, the Supreme  Court almost certainly will enjoy no future opportu-
nities to revisit the issue in Bush, as it did in Furman, and thus  to fix  its
"mistake."  Once elected president, Bush cannot be "unelected."
Finally, from the "basket of issues"  perspective, the Rehnquist Court
might survive Bush v. Gore reasonably unscathed,  because the remainder
of the Court's  constitutional jurisprudence  has  been such a political  grab
bag  of results.  Bush might have  enraged  Democrats  even  more  had  the
conservative  majority that ensured Bush's election been consistently writ-
ing  conservative  values  into  the  Constitution.  But  it has  not.  While  the
Rehnquist Court arguably has been the most activist in history,24'  its activ-
ism does not manifest a consistent political valence. In recent years, liber-
als generally have won on issues involving abortion, school prayer, gender
discrimination,  and freedom of speech. 242 Conservatives, on the other hand,
238.  Smith  v. Allwright,  321  U.S.  649,  669  (1944) (Roberts,  J.,  dissenting).  See supra text
accompanying  notes 37-39.
239.  See, e.g.,  Michael W.  McConnell,  A  Muddled Ruling, WALL  ST. J.,  Dec.  14,  2000,  at A26
("Many of the vice-president's  supporters will continue to believe-probably to their graves-that their
man would have won if only they had been given more time.").
240.  See,  e.g.,  Kaiser,  supra note  15,  at  A25  (reporting  former  White  House  counsel  A.B.
Culvahouse's  view that if Bush is a successfiil president, "lots of people" may end up approving of the
Court's ruling).
241.  Cf.  Larry D.  Kramer, No Surprise. It's an Activist Court, N.Y. TiNi.s  (late  ed.),  Dec.  12,
2000, at A33, reprinted  in BUSH  v. GoRE,  supra  note 20, at 273-75 (noting that, given the extraordinary
activism of  the Rehnquist Court, its decision in Bush should have come as no surprise).
242.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern  Pennsylvania v. Casey,  505  U.S.  833  (1992)
(abortion); Lee v. Weisman,  505 U.S. 577  (1992)  (school prayer); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515  (1996)  (exclusion of women  from Virginia  Military  Institute);  Texas v. Johnson, 491  U.S.  397
(1989)  (flag burning).
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have  triumphed  on  issues  such  as  affirmative  action,
minority voting  districts,  public  aid to parochial  schools,  federalism,  the
death penalty,  and (usually) criminal procedure. 43 Indeed, in the term that
immediately preceded Bush, the Court issued  a series  of important consti-
tutional rulings that were noteworthy mainly for the political  evenhanded-
ness of the results.2"  Liberals  won on  abortion rights,  access to  abortion
clinics,  school prayer, and the continued vitality of Miranda. 245  Conserva-
tives won on  several  important  federalism  issues, public  aid to parochial
schools, and the First Amendment rights of organizations that discriminate
against  gays. 246  Perhaps  Democratic  ire  over  Bush v.  Gore is  somewhat
ameliorated by the Rehnquist  Court's continuing propensity to distribute a
substantial share of constitutional victories  to liberals.  Imagine how differ-
ently conservatives  might have reacted  to  a counterfactual  Warren  Court
ruling in 1968 handing the presidential election to Hubert Humphrey.
CONCLUSION
Where does consideration  of these various  factors  leave  us in evalu-
ating the likely  impact  of Bush v.  Gore on  the Court's  long-term  legiti-
macy?  Roughly  half the  nation probably  will  believe  for  the  indefinite
future that the Supreme  Court stole  (or at least attempted to  steal) a presi-
dential  election  from  their  candidate.  Yet,  after  a  brief  four  years  has
passed, Bush v. Gore will become an unhappy memory rather than a con-
stant irritant. Thus, Bush seems unlikely to harm the Court's standing very
much, especially  if the Justices'  constitutional jurisprudence  continues  to
manifest the uneven political valence that it has in recent years.
The one confident prediction that can be made is that the Senate con-
firmation  hearings  of  future  Supreme  Court  nominees  are  likely  to
243.  See, e.g.,  City of Richmond  v. J.A.  Croson  Co.,  488 U.S. 469 (1989)  (affirmative  action);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.  630 (1993)  (minority voting districts);  Agostini v. Felton, 521  U.S. 203  (1997)
(public aid  to  parochial  schools);  United  States  v. Lopez,  514  U.S.  549  (federalism);  McClesky  v.
Kemp,  481  U.S.  279  (1987)  (death  penalty);  Michigan  Dep't  of State Police  v.  Sitz, 496  U.S.  444
(1990) (sobriety checkpoints permissible under the Fourth Amendment).
244.  See, e.g.,  Edward  Walsh, An  Activist Court Mixes Its High-Profile Message, WASH.  POST,
July 2,  2000, at A6; Kathleen M.  Sullivan, A  Court Not Easy to Classify, N.Y. Timus, June 29, 2000,  at
A31  ("[l]n  the rich  and  important  term  that just  finished  yesterday,  the justices  defied any  simple
political typecasting ....  ).
245.  Stenberg v. Carhart,  530 U.S.  914 (2000) (abortion);  Hill v. Colorado,  530  U.S. 703  (2000)
(abortion clinics); United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (affirming Miranda); Santa Fe Independent
School  Dist. v. Doe, 530  U.S. 290 (2000) (school prayer).
246.  Mitchell  v. Helms,  530  U.S. 793  (2000)  (public  aid to parochial  schools);  Boy Scouts  of
America  v.  Dale,  530  U.S.  640  (2000)  (First  Amendment right  to  exclude  gays);  United States  v.
Morrison,  529  U.S.  598  (2000) (invalidating  Violence Against Women  Act  on  federalism  grounds);
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (invalidating congressional imposition of damages
liability upon states under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
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resemble a war zone.
2 47  This already has been true much of the time since
the late  1960s; consider the fierce  battles over the nominations  of Justice
Abe Fortas (for promotion to Chief Justice), Judges Clement Haynesworth
and Harold Carswell, Judge Robert Bork, and Justice Clarence Thomas.248
And why should we not expect it to be so,  as the Supreme Court increas-
ingly has asserted jurisdiction over the issues that comprise today's culture
wars?  Now that the Justices  not only  make  national policy  on abortion,
school prayer, and affirmative action, but also pick presidents, the stakes of
a Supreme Court appointment,  especially  on this narrowly-divided  Court,
will be ratcheted that much higher.  This battlefield  scenario  is  especially
likely to unfold when President George W. Bush makes his  first nomina-
tion to the Court. Since most Democrats believe that the Court's interven-
tion to make Bush president  was  illegitimate,  they are  sure  to scrutinize
with exacting care his efforts to reshape  the Court in his political image.
While Democrats proved powerless to prevent the Court from picking the
president, they may have greater success, especially in this closely-divided
Senate, at preventing the president from picking the Court.
247.  See, e.g., Kaiser, supra note  15, at A25 (reporting legal historian Howard Gillman's view that
Bush  is likely to  affect the  appointments  process  for  Supreme  Court  Justices);  Stephen  Fidler,  US.
Election: The Final Chapter,  FIN. TmIEs  (London),  Dec.  14, 2000, at  12 (reporting similar views of
Professors  A.E. Dick Howard and Stephen Wermeil); Scot Lehigh, So, Class, What Have We Learned?
Were the Bush-Gore  Lessons Lasting or Was It Just  Another Battle?, BOSTON  GLOBE, Dec.  17, 2000, at
C1  (quoting political  scientist Nelson  Polsby predicting  a "terrible  confirmation  battle"  over Bush's
first Supreme Court nomination).
248.  See generally  ETHAN BRONNER,  BATTLE FOR JUSTICE:  HOW THE BORK NOuNATION SHOOK
AMERICA  (1989);  JOHN  PAUL  FRANK,  CLEMENT  HAYNSWORTH,  THE  SENATE,  AND  THE  SUPREME
COURT  (1991);  LAURA  KALMAN,  ABE  FORTAS:  A  BIOGRAPHY  (1990);  JANE  MAYER  &  JILL
ABRAMSON,  STRANGE JUSTICE:  THE SELLING OF CLARENCE THOtAS (1994).
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